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A TRIPARTITE SOLUTION TO
EYEWITNESS ERROR
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Based on over thirty years of extensive scientific research on eyewitness
testimony, we have developed a comprehensive, practical solution to
eyewitness error, which we present in this article. Our tripartite solution to
eyewitness error consists of the following components: (1) Permitting
expert testimony when the primary or sole evidence against the defendant is
eyewitness testimony, (2) Improving procedures for collecting eyewitness
evidence by conducting eyewitness interviews and identification procedures
in a manner consistent with best practices identified by scientific research
in the field; and (3) Educating the principal participants in the criminal
justice system about eyewitness testimony to sensitize them to the effects of
eyewitness factors. The tripartite solution provides judges, attorneys, law
officers, and jurors with a conceptual framework for understanding and
evaluating eyewitness testimony and gives practical suggestions in the form
of ten guidelines for attorneys to use when either supporting or attacking
the reliability of eyewitness testimony. The article also serves as a
blueprint for the reforms that the criminal justice system must institute to
significantly reduce eyewitness error. Finally, the article explains why
procedural due process requires the adoption of the tripartite solution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification."
' '
"[W]e regularly sentence innocent people to death. So the underlying question
remains: Considering all the attention we devote to death penalty cases, why do we
make so many mistakes?"2
It was just turning dark one October night when a young woman hitchhiker was
picked up on Pacific Highway South 10 miles outside of Seattle by a man with a beard
and a three-piece suit. Instead of driving her to Tacoma, the man turned into an
isolated dirt road, raped her and left her by the side of the road.
Just 24 hours later, the rape victim, shown an array of photographs by detectives,
identified Steven Titus as her rapist. Largely on the basis of her testimony, Mr. Titus
was found guilty.
But a few months after Mr. Titus's conviction, new evidence suggested a different
suspect was responsible for a series of rapes, including this one. When the rape
victim saw the photograph of the new suspect, she realized he was her rapist and
broke down in tears, saying, 'Oh my God, what have I done to Mr. Titus?'
Though Mr. Titus was released, his life was in shambles: he had used all his money
for his defense, had lost his job and good reputation and had been left by his fiancee.
Mr. Titus spent the next four years in a struggle to sue the authorities. Eleven days
before the case was to come to trial, Mr. Titus died of a heart attack. Ten months later
his estate was awarded a settlement of $2.8 million.
The circumstances of this case are not unusual.
3
The purpose of this article is to delineate a tripartite solution to
eyewitness error that is based on over thirty years of extensive scientific
research on eyewitness testimony. The criminal justice system depends on
eyewitness evidence. It is often the only evidence available in a criminal
case and, where properly handled, can be very reliable. The solution
proposed here maintains the availability of eyewitness evidence, while
instituting safeguards to promote its reliability and accuracy.
Part II of this article describes the extent of the problem of wrongful
convictions, reviewing empirical studies that estimate the contribution of
eyewitness errors to wrongful convictions, the difficulties eyewitnesses
1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (footnote omitted).
2 Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 133 (1998).
3 Daniel Goleman, Studies Point to Flaws in Lineups of Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
1995, at C 1.
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have in accurately identifying the perpetrator of a crime, and the powerful
impact that eyewitness testimony has on the trier of fact. Part III depicts
how American courts have responded to the problem of eyewitness error
and analyzes whether those responses have been adequate.
Part IV introduces the tripartite solution. Its first component is
permitting expert testimony when the primary or sole evidence against the
defendant is eyewitness testimony. The second component is improving
law enforcement's procedures for collecting eyewitness evidence. The
article describes a scientifically validated method for interviewing
eyewitnesses that significantly increases the amount of accurate information
obtained from eyewitnesses and decreases the probability of contaminating
their memory of the crime. The article then discusses how to further
improve investigatory procedures for eyewitness evidence by proposing
changes in identification procedures that scientific research has shown can
significantly reduce erroneous eyewitness identifications. Finally, the
article introduces the third component of the tripartite solution, delineating
how and by what means educating the principal participants of the criminal
justice system about eyewitness testimony could reduce eyewitness error.
This article concludes with an additional imperative for implementing the
tripartite solution: the constitutional demands of procedural due process.
II. EYEWITNESS ERROR'S ROLE IN WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
A. THE NUMBER OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
To understand the impact of eyewitness error on the criminal justice
system, it is first necessary to consider the scope of the problem of
wrongful convictions. In 2002, over one million adults were convicted of
felonies in the United States.4 One survey of Ohio criminal justice officials
estimates that wrongful convictions occur in about I of every 200 felony
criminal cases (.5%) . This translates to more than 5000 innocent persons
being convicted of serious crimes in 2002. However, DNA testing of
criminal suspects suggests that the percentage of wrongful convictions may
be much higher. 6 For example, a 1995 survey of public and private forensic
4 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Sentencing Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
sent.htm (May 24, 2007).
5 John C. Brigham et al., Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal
and Scientific Issues, 36 CT. REV. 12, 13 (1999).
6 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL 20 (1996).
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laboratories in the United States indicated that DNA tests had been
conducted in 21,621 criminal cases. Of these:
DNA testing exonerated the suspect in 23% of the cases. In another 16% of the cases,
DNA tests produced inconclusive results [often due to deteriorated or insufficiently
large samples]. In other words, in those cases in which there was a conclusive DNA
test result (a sample of many thousands of cases), 27% of the suspects were
exonerated by the test.
One-half of all persons arrested for serious crimes are ultimately
convicted.9  In 1999, Dripps noted that many of the suspects now
exonerated by DNA testing would have been indicted prior to its use.1°
This implies that there may have been "a false conviction rate in the past of
greater than 10% for criminal cases where DNA testing is now possible.""
More importantly, Dripps asserts that factors such as eyewitness error,
which were likely to cause wrongful indictments in DNA cases, continue to
produce wrongful indictments in criminal cases where there is no testable
biological evidence. 12 "A false conviction rate of 10% would imply almost
100,000 wrongful felony convictions every year."'
' 3
A 1987 study determined that in approximately 80,000 criminal trials
every year in the United States the sole or primary evidence against the
7 Id.
8 Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
635, 638-39 (1999) (citing CONNORS ET AL., supra note 6, at xxx, 20). Since DNA evidence
was first introduced into the criminal justice system, it has exonerated more than 340 people
who were wrongfully convicted of crimes. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the
United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005). Sixty-
four percent of the exonerations involved at least one eyewitness misidentification. Id. at
542. Eighty-eight percent of the rape exonerations involved eyewitness misidentification.
Id. at 530; see also Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN.
REV. OF PSYCHOL. 277, 278 (2003) (stating that more than 100 prisoners have been
exonerated by DNA evidence).
9 C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Societal Tolerance of Injustice, 4 RES. Soc.
PROBS. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 102 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE (1983)).
10 See Dripps, supra note 8, at 639 ("In short, the sample of persons tested is pretty close
to a sample of persons who would, in the absence of DNA evidence, have gone to trial.").
II Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Survey of Judges' Knowledge and Beliefs About
Eyewitness Testimony, 40 CT. REV. 6 (2003); see also Dripps, supra note 8, at 638-39 ("None
of these explanations seems very powerful."). In other words, the DNA cases are
representative of criminal cases where DNA testing is not possible.
12 See Dripps, supra note 8, at 639.
13 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 6; see also Dripps, supra note 8, at 638-39 ("None of
these explanations seems very powerful."). In other words, the DNA cases are
representative of criminal cases where DNA testing is not possible.
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defendant was eyewitness testimony.' 4  However, science is increasingly
revealing that a significant percentage of eyewitness testimony is wrong.
"Erroneous eyewitness testimony ... no doubt is the single greatest cause
of wrongful convictions in the U.S. criminal justice system."' 5 In one study
of 340 convictions, eyewitness error played a role in 64% of wrongful
convictions.' 6 In the first 180 DNA exoneration cases, eyewitness error was
a cause of the wrongful conviction in 75% or more of the cases.'
7
The United States judiciary has been aware for some time of the
problem posed by eyewitness error. 18 For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
There can be no reasonable doubt that inaccurate eyewitness testimony may be one of
the most prejudicial features of a criminal trial. Juries, naturally desirous to punish a
vicious crime, may well be unschooled in the effects that the subtle compound of
suggestion, anxiety, and forgetfulness in the face of the need to recall often has on
witnesses. Accordingly, doubts over the strength of the evidence of a defendant's
guilt may be resolved on the basis of the eyewitness' seeming certainty when he
14 Goleman, supra note 3, at Cl; see also Edith Greene, Judge's Instructions on
Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 252, 273
(1988) (reporting that judges estimated that 26% of the trials over which they presided
involved eyewitness identification as a major issue).
15 Rob Warden, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, How
Mistaken and Perjured Eyewitness Identification Testimony Put 46 Innocent Americans on
Death Row, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/exonerations/Research/
eyewitnessstudyl.htm (last visited July 24, 2006); see also Garrett L. Berman & Brian L.
Cutler, Effects of Inconsistencies in Eyewitness Testimony on Mock-Juror Decision Making,
2 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 170, 170 (1996) (stating that "[flalse eyewitness
identifications... appear to be one of the leading causes of erroneous conviction") (internal
citations omitted); Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on
the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 112, 112 (2002) ("[M]istaken identifications are the largest single cause of
wrongful convictions."); Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in
Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2005) (quoting United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) ("[M]istaken identification 'probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.')). Indeed, Borchard identified
erroneous eyewitness identification as a leading cause of false conviction over seventy years
ago. EDWARD M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT XII (1932).
16 Gross et al., supra note 8, at 542; see also Huff, supra note 9, at 101, 103 (finding
eyewitness error in nearly 60% of approximately 500 wrongful convictions).
17 See Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45, 48 (2006) ("As of this writing, there have been more than 180
definitive DNA exonerations: the proportion that involves eyewitness identifications
continues to run about 75% or more."); see also The Innocence Project,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
'8 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 605 (1998).
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Similarly, Brigham and Bothwell wrote, "[J]urors appear to regard
eyewitness evidence as one of the most persuasive kinds of evidence that
can be presented., 20 Jurors place such great faith in eyewitness testimony
because they seemingly believe that perceptual memory is like a videotape
that can be replayed with near perfect fidelity.2' Accordingly, when an
eyewitness testifies, he or she "can simply play back the appropriate tape."
22
However, scientific research has revealed that eyewitness memory is much
more malleable and susceptible to error than is generally realized.23
III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF EYEWITNESS
ERROR
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE
The eyewitness problem has not escaped the attention of our highest
court. In 1967, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of eyewitness
identification in a trilogy of cases: United States v. Wade,24 Gilbert v.
California,25 and Stovall v. Denno.26 In Wade, the Court held that because a
post-indictment pre-trial lineup is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, a
defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to have an attorney
present at a post-indictment lineup.27 The Court further stated that if an
attorney is not present at a post-indictment pre-trial lineup, the eyewitness's
identification of the defendant is inadmissible.28 However, in the event that
the post-indictment pre-trial lineup is inadmissible, the State can still use
the eyewitness's courtroom identification of the defendant as evidence of
the defendant's guilt.
29
19 Kampshoff v. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 585 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967)).
20 John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate
the Accuracy ofEyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19,19 (1983).
2 Id. at 20.
22 Id.
23 See Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 14; Wells et al., supra note 18, at 624.
24 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
25 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
26 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
27 388 U.S. at 237-38.
28 Id. at 240.
29 Id. ("The State may then rest upon the witnesses' unequivocal courtroom
identifications, and not mention the [post-indictment] pretrial identification as part of the
State's case at trial.").
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In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that the State is not entitled to
show that eyewitness testimony which was the direct result of an illegal
post-indictment lineup could be substantiated by an independent source.3°
Instead, the trial court must grant the defendant a new trial if such
testimony was presented at the guilt stage, or grant appropriate relief if the
testimony was presented at the penalty stage, unless it is determined that the
admission of the eyewitness's identification was harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt.
31
In Stovall,32 the Court addressed whether a suggestive identification
procedure necessitated by exigent circumstances that was conducive to an
erroneous identification constituted a denial of due process.33 The Court
held that the totality of the circumstances must be examined when there is
an alleged violation of due process in conducting an identification
procedure.34 Thus, in Stovall, the Court found that, though the eyewitness's
identification of the defendant was suggestive, it was imperative because
the only eyewitness was in a hospital with life-threatening injuries.35
"Under [the] circumstances, the usual police station lineup ... was out of
the question. 36
One year later, in Simmons v. United States,37 the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether an in-court identification of a defendant is
admissible if it has been tainted by suggestive pre-trial identification
photographs necessitated by exigent circumstances.38 Applying the same
standard it previously enunciated in Stovall, the Court ruled that in-court
30 388 U.S. at 272-73.
31 Id. at 274.
32 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
33 Id. at 302. The defendant in Stovall was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
Id. at 295. One day after the murder, the police brought the defendant in handcuffs to a
hospital room so the victim's wife, who had been seriously injured during the murder, could
identify him. Id. After observing the defendant and hearing him speak, the victim's wife
identified the defendant as her husband's murderer. Id. The defendant asserted on appeal
that his showup in the hospital was unconstitutional because, among other reasons, its
suggestiveness violated due process. Id. at 295-96.
14 Id. at 302.
35 Id.
36 Id.
" 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
38 Id. 381. In Simmons, the defendant was convicted of robbing a bank. Id. The day
after the bank robbery, FBI agents showed five bank employees some photos consisting
mostly of group pictures of the defendant and others. Id. After viewing the photos, the bank
employees all identified the defendant as one of the bank robbers. Id. At a later date, the
FBI interviewed the bank employees for a second time and showed them other photos that
included the defendant's photo. Id. They once again identified the defendant as a
perpetrator of the crime. Id.
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identifications would be permissible, notwithstanding the use of suggestive
photographs, as long as their use was necessary and the in-court
identifications were reliable.
39
Five years later, in Kirby v. Illinois,40 the Supreme Court clarified its
holdings in Wade and Gilbert by ruling that an individual has a right to
counsel in a pre-trial identification procedure only if it took place after
criminal proceedings had been initiated against the defendant.4 '
Furthermore, in United States v. Ash,42 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant does not have a right to an attorney at a photo array, even if the
defendant has been indicted, ruling that a photo array is not a "trial-like
adversary confrontation ' 3 meriting Sixth Amendment protection.44  As a
consequence of the Supreme Court's rulings in Kirby and Ash, law
enforcement agencies generally conduct lineups prior to indictments or use
photo arrays to identify suspects so they are not required to have the
defendant's attorney present at an identification. 45  Thus, the Supreme
Court's decisions in Kirby and Ash largely negate the effect of its earlier
rulings in Wade and Gilbert.46
In Neil v. Biggers47 and Manson v. Brathwaite,48 the Supreme Court
rendered its final major decisions on suggestive identification procedures.
The Court ruled that such identification procedures, even those from
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, were admissible provided they were
'9 Id. at 385-86.
40 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
41 Id. at 689.
42 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
41 Id. at 317.
44Id.
45 See Dripps, supra note 8, at 656-57.
46 See id.
[T]he Court's focus on the Bill of Rights ... undermined even the modest protection supplied by
the Wade rule. Given the Fifth Amendment privilege, suspects can be questioned only before the
right to counsel attaches. Therefore it was imperative that the right to counsel attach late enough
in the process for the police to get a crack at the suspect under the Miranda rules. Fairly
supported by the language of the Sixth Amendment, the Court held that the 'prosecution' does
not commence until formal charges are filed. Thus by delaying accusation until after the lineup,
the police can entirely circumvent the Wade rule.
Id.; see also Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative
Evidence in Due Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L.
REv. 1097, 1109 (2003) ("The application of the Sixth Amendment to certain identifications
has thus proved to be a somewhat hollow victory for defendants.").
4' 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
48 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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reliable. 49 The Court further held that this reliability is to be determined by
the "totality of the circumstances,"5 ° a standard first mentioned in Stovall,
and delineated five eyewitness factors that the trier of fact must consider
when making this determination: (1) the eyewitness's opportunity to view
the perpetrator during the crime; (2) the length of time between the crime
and the subsequent identification; (3) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (4) the accuracy of the eyewitness's prior
description of the criminal; and (5) the eyewitness's degree of attention
during the crime [hereinafter "the Supreme Court eyewitness factors"]. 5' In
summary, Supreme Court decisions, taken together, are supportive of the
admissibility of eyewitness testimony, even where highly suggestive
identification techniques are used, provided the identification is deemed
reliable.
52
B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY ARE
CONTRARY TO SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS
The Supreme Court decisions on eyewitness testimony predate the vast
majority of the scientific research on the causes of eyewitness errors and
thus constitute "educated guesses" by the Court on how various eyewitness
factors and identification procedures affect identification accuracy.53
Unfortunately, scientific research has shown that many of the Supreme
Court's assumptions about eyewitness testimony are erroneous.54 The
Court's decisions in Neil and Manson are good illustrations of this
difficulty. Empirical studies indicate that many of the eyewitness factors
that the Supreme Court mandated the trier of fact to consider when
evaluating eyewitness testimony do not affect eyewitness accuracy the way
the Supreme Court assumed they do.55
41 Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200. In Neil, the rape victim viewed the defendant in a showup
rather than in a lineup even though the showup occurred seven months after the rape. Id. at
196. In Manson, an undercover police officer made a drug purchase and was shown a single
photo of the defendant shortly thereafter. Manson, 432 U.S. at 98.
50 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)); Neil,
409 U.S. at 199.
51 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
52 But see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (finding a violation of the
Sixth Amendment where counsel is not present at a post-indictment lineup). See also Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
53 Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 17.
14 Id. at 17-19.
55 Id. at 17-18. Witnesses with a better opportunity to observe the criminal, such as
under better lighting, with a closer view, or a longer viewing time, are more likely to make
accurate identifications. Id. Second, the length of the retention interval, which is the time
between the crime and the identification, is generally related to accuracy. Id.
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For example, the first Supreme Court eyewitness factor is the
eyewitness's opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime.56 While the
Court was correct in stating that eyewitnesses who have a better opportunity
to observe the perpetrator of a crime 57 are more likely to make accurate
identifications than eyewitnesses who view crimes under poor conditions,
58
scientific study has revealed that post-event information, such as a lineup
administrator's comment that the eyewitness has identified the suspect, can
distort the eyewitness's memory of how good his or her view of the crime
was.
59
With regard to the second factor, the Supreme Court is right that the
retention interval, or the length of the time between the crime and the
60identification, is generally related to accuracy, with shorter intervals
generally producing more accurate eyewitness identifications than longer
intervals.6' Scientific studies show, however, that other factors, such as
stress and race of the witness and suspect, may interact with the retention
interval to affect the accuracy of an eyewitness's identification.62
Scientific research has also called factor three into question.63 By the
time of trial, an eyewitness's confidence in his or her identification has little
relationship to identification accuracy because of the many post-event
factors that affect confidence but not accuracy.64 Moreover, the Supreme
56 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199.
57 Eyewitnesses may have a better opportunity to observe the perpetrator of the crime
due to such factors as better lighting, close proximity to the crime, and duration of the crime.
BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 161 (1995).
58 Bradfield et al., supra note 15, at 112.
51 Id. at 113.
60 Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 17.
61 Id.
62 John C. Brigham et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in a Field Setting, 42 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 673, 679-80 (1982).
63 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199
(1972).
64 D. Stephen Lindsay et al., Witnessing-Condition Heterogeneity and Witnesses' Versus
Investigators' Confidences in the Accuracy of Witnesses' Identification Decisions, 24 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 685, 695 (2000). The results of studies on eyewitness confidence generally
indicate that highly confident eyewitnesses are only somewhat more likely to make accurate
identifications than less confident eyewitnesses. Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray,
Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 155,
155-70 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984). Although some recent studies
show that eyewitness confidence may have significantly greater probative value in predicting




Court's reliance on this factor is particularly troubling because scientific
research has shown that it is the single most important factor that
determines whether jurors believe that an eyewitness has made an accurate
identification.65
Regarding the fourth factor, empirical studies have demonstrated that
eyewitness accuracy in describing a perpetrator is not related to eyewitness
accuracy in identifying a perpetrator.66 Thus, the Court erred in holding
that the trier of fact should consider the accuracy of an eyewitness's prior
description of the perpetrator in evaluating the accuracy of his or her
identification.
67
The final eyewitness factor is the quality of an eyewitness's attention.68
Although research has established that eyewitnesses who pay greater
attention to a crime generally make more accurate identifications than those
who pay less attention, fear, stress, and the presence of a weapon may have
69a significant negative impact on the witness's ability to attend to a crime.
Furthermore, post-event information, such as police confirmation that the
eyewitness has identified the suspect in a lineup, can distort the
[S]ubstantial CA [confidence accuracy] obtained in this study and in some others. . should not
be construed as evidence that the confidence witnesses display in court predicts the accuracy of
their eyewitness testimony. Myriad social, cognitive, and statistical factors likely greatly
attenuate the CA relationship over the months between when a crime was witnessed and when
the witness testifies. It is not to courtroom testimony to which the current findings may
generalize, but rather to initial identification decisions made in nonbiased testing situations
shortly after a witnessed event.
Lindsay et al., supra note 64, at 695 (citations omitted).
65 Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
360, 361 (1998).
66 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, A Maturing of Research on the Behaviour of Eyewitnesses,
5 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 377, 393 (1991).
67 Id.
The common-sense assumption accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court [in Neil] is that there should
be a strong relation between a witness's accuracy of prior verbal description of a suspect and
subsequent identification accuracy. At least five studies have involved explicit testing of this
notion.... [A]II found no relationship between prior verbal description accuracy and subsequent
face identification accuracy.
Id. (citing Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 18). "Wells... found a statistically significant,
yet very modest, correlation of .27. He noted, however, that this correlation was not due to
better describers being better identifiers. Rather, it was due to the fact that faces that are
better described are better identified." Id.
68 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199.
69 Deffenbacher, supra note 66, at 386-87.
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eyewitness's memory of the crime and cause him or her to overestimate the
amount of attention he or she paid to the perpetrator.
70
The Supreme Court eyewitness factors are also deficient because they
are incomplete. Scientific study shows the importance of considering such
factors as the wording of questions, 71 lineup instructions,7 confidence
malleability, 73 mugshot-induced bias, 74 post-event information, 75 child
suggestibility, 76 attitudes and expectations, 77 alcoholic intoxication, 78 cross-
race bias,79  weapons focus,80  forgetting curve,
8  exposure time, 82
presentation format, unconscious transference,84  stress,85  age,86  and
disguise.87
70 Wells & Bradfield, supra note 65, at 374.
A confirming-feedback remark not only inflates eyewitnesses' recollections of how confident
they were at the time, it also leads them to report that they had a better view of a culprit, that they
could make out details of the face, that they were able to able to easily and quickly pick him out
of a lineup, that his face just "popped out" to them, that their memorial image is particularly
clear, and that they are adept at recognizing faces of strangers.
Id.
71 Saul M. Kassin et al., On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony
Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405,405 (2001).
72 "Police instructions can affect an eyewitness's willingness to make identification." Id.
at 408.
73 "An eyewitness's confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to
identification accuracy." Id.
74 "Exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases the likelihood that the witness will later
choose that suspect in a lineup." Id.
75 "Eyewitness testimony about an event reflects not only what they actually saw but
information they obtained later on." Id.
76 "Young children are more vulnerable than adults to interviewer suggestion, peer
pressures, and other social influences." Id.
77 "An eyewitness's perception and memory for an event may be affected by his or her
attitudes and expectations." Id.
78 "Alcoholic intoxication impairs an eyewitness's later ability to recall persons and
events." Id.
79 "Eyewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their own race than
members of other races." Id.; see also Deffenbacher, supra note 66, at 390.
80 "The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness's ability to accurately identify the
perpetrator's face." Kassin et al., supra note 71, at 408. But see Bruce W. Behrman &
Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis,
25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 485 (2001) (reporting that weapon focus was not found in their
study and suggesting that the weapon focus effect "is simply not a real-life phenomenon").
81 "The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after the event and then levels
off over time." Kassin et al., supra note 71, at 408.
82 "The less time an eyewitness has to observe an event, the less well he or she will
remember it." Id.
83 "Witnesses are more likely to misidentify someone by making a relative judgment
when presented with a simultaneous (as opposed to sequential) lineup." Id.
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In summary, the Supreme Court's decisions on eyewitness
identifications fail to incorporate scientific research on eyewitness
testimony and therefore permit many preventable eyewitness errors.
C. THE RELUCTANCE OF AMERICAN COURTS TO INSTITUTE NEW
SAFEGUARDS
Both the Supreme Court and other United States courts have failed
to demonstrate adequate flexibility and innovation in dealing with the
eyewitness problem, instead restricting their response to the use of
traditional safeguards, such as motions to suppress identifications, voir dire,
cross-examination, closing argument, and juror instructions to deal with the
problem of eyewitness error.88  Unfortunately, these safeguards are not
effective in preventing eyewitness error. 89  Ironically, courts have been
reluctant to permit expert eyewitness testimony even though it is the only
traditional legal safeguard that has shown any efficacy in mitigating
eyewitness error. 90 The ability of American courts to cope with the problem
of eyewitness error has, in the past, also been hampered by the traditional
standard employed to rule on the admissibility of scientific evidence.91 A
brief review of the landmark cases on the admissibility of scientific
evidence in the United States is revealing.
84 "Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone they have seen in another
situation or context." Id.
85 "Very high levels of stress impair the accuracy of eyewitness testimony." Id.; see also
Deffenbacher, supra note 66, at 388.
86 Deffenbacher, supra note 66, at 391.
87 Id. at 390. For an excellent discussion of eyewitness factors that affect identification
accuracy, see Douglas J. Narby et al., The Effects of Witness, Target, and Situational Factors
on Eyewitness Identifications, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
23, 23-52 (Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al. eds., 1996).
88 Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, I
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 909, 911,923 (1995).
89 Berman & Cutler, supra note 15, at 170.
90 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 57, at 139-68, 241 ("These results are consistent
with the findings from a growing body of research on expert psychological testimony which
indicate that expert testimony has a salutary effect on juror decision processes. In this
respect, we are optimistic about its value as a safeguard, especially in light of the more
dismal findings for cross-examination."); Steven D. Penrod & Brian Cutler, Preventing
Mistaken Conviction in Eyewitness Identifcation Trials: The Case Against Traditional
Safeguards, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 89, 115 (Ronald
Roesch et al. eds., 1999); Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 23-25; Leippe, supra note 88, at
923-24; see also Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 15 ("The only legal safeguard that has been
empirically shown to be effective in educating jurors about eyewitness testimony is expert
testimony.").
91 See Leippe, supra note 88, at 912-13.
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In Frye v. United States,92 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled that "novel" scientific evidence is admissible in
a case only if the principles and methodology through which the scientific
evidence is collected have received the "general acceptance" of the experts
in the field.93 This strict standard excluded much necessary, valid scientific
evidence merely because it had not yet achieved general acceptance in the
scientific community. 9
A competing standard was enunciated in the 1993 landmark case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.95  In that decision, the
United States Supreme Court overruled the "general acceptance" standard
of Frye and replaced it with a new standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence in the federal courts.9 6  Although the
Daubert ruling only applies to federal courts, many states have adopted it. 97
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that a "rigid 'general acceptance'
requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules
[of Evidence] and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers' to 'opinion testimony."'' 98 In so holding, the Court found that the
primary criteria for determining whether scientific evidence is admissible
should be its "scientific validity," rather than its general acceptance within
the scientific community. 99 This decision placed the primary burden for
determining the validity of scientific evidence on trial judges, ruling that a
court must evaluate the scientific method employed and the application of
that scientific method to facts of the case.' 00 The Court delineated some
guidelines for determining the validity of purported scientific evidence:
92 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
93 Id. at 1014; see also Kassin et al., supra note 71, at 406 (examining Frye).
94 Michael R. Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for
Process Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 681, 689 (2002)
("This stringent standard excluded a great deal of testimony based on methodologies whose
value was subject to debate in the relevant scientific field.").
95 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
96 Id. at 589.
97 But, as of 2001, seventeen states continued to use the Frye test. See Kassin et al.,
supra note 71, at 406.
" 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
99 Id. at 594-95; Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 19.
100 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert requiring trial
judges to determine the validity of scientific evidence creates difficulties because, as
empirical data indicates, judges frequently possess insufficient knowledge of the scientific
method to accurately assess the validity of expert testimony. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar & Shari




(1) Can it be empirically tested, and if so, has it been empirically
tested?
(2) Has it been published in scientific journals that are subject to peer
review?
(3) What are its known or potential error rates?
(4) Is it generally accepted in the scientific community? 1o1
The voluminous research on eyewitness testimony satisfies this
balancing test.102
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,10 3 the Supreme Court extended the
Daubert "scientific validity" standard to all expert testimony, including
testimony that is "technical"' 0 4 as well as testimony based on "other
specialized knowledge."' 10 5 The Court also found that a trial court need not
apply all of the Daubert factors in every case, and that indeed a court may
consider factors not enumerated in Daubert when determining the validity
of expert testimony.'0 6 The Kumho opinion suggests that scientific validity
is the most important criterion in determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.'
0 7
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,0 8 the Supreme Court, building on its
opinion in Kumho, held that a trial court's ruling on the admission of expert
testimony must be reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. 09
Consequently, federal appellate courts and most state appellate courts now
rarely reverse a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony
"unless manifestly erroneous." '" 0 In summary, in jurisdictions that follow
Daubert, courts must generally make three determinations in ruling on the
admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony First, is the expert testimony
reliable in both the sense that the methodology and reasoning employed by
the eyewitness expert have scientific validity, and that the expert's
101 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
102 Thomas Dillickrath, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Admissibility and
Alternatives, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1059, 1065 (2001).
103 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
04 Id. at 141.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 141-42. In fact, the Kumho opinion led to an amendment of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 that buttressed a trial court's ability to exclude eyewitness expert testimony
with impunity, as they could now offer a "rules-oriented basis for the exclusion."
Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1066.
107 Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1065. However, Dillickrath suggests that this fact can
be a "sufficient rationale" for the exclusion of expert testimony. Id. at 1066.
'0' 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
09 Id. at 143.
'o Id. at 142.
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conclusion is supported by the facts of the case?..' Second, is the
eyewitness expert's testimony relevant to the case? In other words, will the
testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a
fact in issue"?"l2 Third, is the probative value of the eyewitness expert's
testimony substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value?" 3 Finally, in
jurisdictions that still follow Frye, courts ascertain whether the principles
and methods employed by the eyewitness expert have gained "general
acceptance" in the scientific community.
14
In general, the applicable legal standards usually result in the judge
ruling that expert psychological testimony on eyewitness testimony is
inadmissible."15 Moreover, in the federal courts and in most state courts, an
appellate court will generally not overrule a trial court's decision to admit
or exclude eyewitness expert testimony unless the trial court judge abused
his or her discretion in making that determination. 16  Nevertheless,
scientific studies have demonstrated that eyewitness testimony is frequently
flawed and that the present preventative measures taken by courts are
generally inadequate. Indeed, as one expert has explained, "[there is] a
vacuum in legal standards that ignores the last decade of research" on
eyewitness testimony."' As such, new measures are called for. We
therefore propose the tripartite solution.
IV. THE TRIPARTITE SOLUTION
As previously stated, the tripartite solution involves:
(1) Permitting expert testimony when the primary or sole evidence
against the defendant is eyewitness testimony;
(2) Improving procedures for collecting eyewitness evidence by
conducting eyewitness interviews and identification procedures in a
manner consistent with best practices identified by scientific research
in the field; and
(3) Educating the principal participants in the criminal justice system
about eyewitness testimony to sensitize them to the effects of
eyewitness factors.
See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 14:77 (6th ed. 2002).
112 Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591
(1993)).
113 FED. R. EVID. 403.
114 FISHMAN, supra note 111, at § 14:77 n.83.
115 See Berman & Cutler, supra note 15, at 170; see also Dillickrath, supra note 102, at
1060.
116 See Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1060.
117 Daniel Goleman, supra note 3, at C7 (quoting interview with Stephen Penrod).
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A. FIRST COMPONENT OF THE TRIPARTITE SOLUTION: PERMITTING
EXPERT TESTIMONY WHEN THE PRIMARY OR SOLE EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IS EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
The first component of the tripartite solution consists of permitting
expert testimony when the primary or sole evidence against the defendant is
eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness expert testimony "refers to the delivery
to a jury by a qualified research psychologist of information about research
and theory on eyewitness behavior."" 8  During this testimony the
eyewitness expert explains to jurors how memory works, the relevant
eyewitness research, and what eyewitness factors may have affected the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. The eyewitness expert does not express
an opinion on the ultimate issue (i.e., the accuracy of the eyewitness)." 9
1. Are Courts Justified in Their Exclusion of Eyewitness Expert Testimony?
Although some courts admit eyewitness expert testimony, the vast
majority of courts are skeptical of its value, if not outright hostile to its
admission.12  In excluding eyewitness expert testimony, courts have
generally given one or more of the following reasons 121: (a) the testimony
of the eyewitness expert would concern matters already within the jury's
knowledge; 22 (b) traditional legal safeguards, such as voir dire, cross-
examination, closing argument, jury instructions, and motions to suppress
118 Leippe, supra note 88, at 910.
119 Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 311,312 (1989) (internal citation omitted).
120 Headley, supra note 94, at 692; see also James M. Doyle, No Confidence: A Step
Toward Accuracy in Eyewitness Testimony, THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 12 (noting
that "hostility to expert testimony on eyewitness identification remains strong ....").
121 For a discussion of the reasons courts generally give for excluding eyewitness expert
testimony, see FISHMAN, supra note 111, at § 14:78; Leippe, supra note 88, at 912; and
Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony
on Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 46 A.L.R. 4th 1047, § 3(a) (1986). Judges appear to
be hostile to the admission of eyewitness expert testimony for several reasons. First, they
are not knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony, and therefore do not realize that the
effect of many eyewitness factors on identification accuracy is not a matter of common
sense. They also appear to be concerned about the time and expense that would result from
permitting expert testimony. Finally, they seem to believe that jurors will perfunctorily
follow the opinion of the expert resulting in guilty defendants going free. See Brigham et al.,
supra note 5, at 25; Wells et al., supra note 17, at 48; Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 13.
122 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992)) ("[B]ecause it addresses an issue of
which the jury already generally is aware ... it will not contribute to their understanding of
the particular factual issue posed.").
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are sufficient to guard against eyewitness error; 2 3 (c) the eyewitness
expert's testimony would prejudice the jury or usurp its discretion;' 24 (d)
eyewitness expert testimony is unnecessary when the eyewitness is a law
enforcement officer or someone else trained to make accurate
identifications in stressful situations; 25 (e) pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 704 and other authorities, the prejudicial value of eyewitness
expert testimony substantially outweighs its probative value because it will
cause jurors to become unduly skeptical of eyewitness testimony. 126 The
validity of each of these reasons for excluding eyewitness expert testimony
is discussed below.
a. The Testimony of the Eyewitness Expert Would Concern Matters
Already Within the Jury's Knowledge
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that expert testimony "assist the




Using a variety of methods to test jurors' knowledge of eyewitnesses,
researchers have found that: (1) jurors have limited knowledge of the
factors that influence eyewitness accuracy, 28 such as the effects of the
perpetrator wearing a hat' 29 or using a weapon' 30 on identification accuracy;
123 Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1061. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d
621, 631 (Pa. 1995) ("Moreover, appellant was free to and did attack the witnesses'
credibility and point out inconsistencies of all the eyewitnesses at trial through cross-
examination and in his closing argument.").
124 See, e.g., United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[P]roposed
testimony intrudes too much on the traditional province of the jury to assess witness
credibility.").
125 See, e.g., Webster v. United States, 623 A.2d 1198, 1204 & n.15 (D.C. 1993)
(suggesting that typical concerns about eyewitness identification are almost wholly absent in
situations where the eyewitness is trained in the art and comes expecting to have to identify
an individual, as in undercover drug buys).
126 See, e.g., State v. Hill, 463 N.W.2d 674, 678 (S.D. 1990) ("[A]ny small aid the expert
testimony might have provided would be outweighed by the unfair prejudice which might
have resulted because of the aura of reliability and trustworthiness surrounding scientific
evidence.").
127 Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1063 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).
128 Id. at 1062-63 ("[G]iven the low level of knowledge the general public has regarding
the reliability of eyewitness identification, proponents would argue that under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, expert testimony would help the trier of fact to understand an area outside
the scope of his or her general knowledge."); Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 12.
129 See generally K. E. Patterson & A. D. Baddeley, When Face Recognition Fails, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 406-17 (1977); Peter N. Shapiro &
Steven D. Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139-
56 (1986).
130 Elizabeth Loftus et al., Some Facts About "Weapons Focus," 11 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 55, 55-62 (1987); see also Kassin et al., supra note 71, at 412; Nancy Mehrkens
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(2) jurors rely on factors which are not good indicators of eyewitness
accuracy, such as eyewitness confidence, 31 memory for minor or trivial
details, 32 and inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony;' 33 (3) jurors
overestimate the ability of eyewitnesses to make accurate identifications;
34
and (4) jurors in mock trials cannot distinguish accurate from inaccurate
eyewitnesses. 135 In short, scientific research shows that jurors have limited
knowledge of eyewitness factors and cannot determine whether an
eyewitness has made an accurate identification.
36
Moreover, a recent study suggests that judges are not well situated to
ascertain the level of juror knowledge regarding eyewitness factors, as they
too are limited in their understanding of eyewitness testimony. 37 Where
the judges were assessed with the same instrument given to eyewitness
experts, 138 judges' answers diverged significantly from those of the
experts. 139  Areas in which the judges showed little consensus included
knowledge of the relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy
Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413,
413-24 (1992).
131 Gary L. Wells, How Adequate Is Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness
Testimony?, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 256-72 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds.,
1984).
132 Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom: The Power
of(a Few) Minor Details, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669, 669 (1989).
133 Berman & Cutler, supra note 15, at 170.
134 Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 20, at 28.
135 R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within
and Across Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 79 (1981); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-
Juror Belief ofAccurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 333,333 (1989).
136 Leippe, supra note 88, at 921, warns that even though research reveals that the effects
of many eyewitness factors are not a matter of common sense, people nonetheless tend to
come to this conclusion once an expert explains the factors' effects. Because of this
hindsight bias, Leippe predicts that many courts will continue to exclude expert testimony,
despite the strong empirical evidence indicating it is not a matter of common sense. Id. In
other words, once a judge learns the nature of the eyewitness expert's testimony and the
basis of it, the judge is likely to conclude that the testimony will just concern matters of
common sense because of the hindsight bias. Id.
137 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 13; see also Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
338, 345 (1997).
138 This instrument was developed by Saul Kassin and his colleagues to survey sixty-four
eyewitness experts about eyewitness factors that affect identification accuracy. Saul M.
Kassin et al., The "'General Acceptance" of Psychological Research on Eyewitness
Testimony: A Survey of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1089 (1989).
139 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 13.
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at trial 140 and whether jurors can distinguish accurate from inaccurate
eyewitnesses. 141 Many judges appeared to be unfamiliar with simultaneous
lineups,142 the forgetting curve, 143 and with studies indicating that half or
more of all wrongful felony convictions are due at least in part to
eyewitness error. 144 The judges were both less knowledgeable 45 and more
likely than eyewitness experts to believe the average juror would know the
correct answer to the items on the survey. 146 For the judges, experience,
both legal and judicial, had no bearing on their knowledge of eyewitness
factors. 147
In a follow-up study, undergraduates and law students answered the
same eyewitness questionnaire as the judges. 148 This study found that the
judges were no more knowledgeable about eyewitness factors than
undergraduates and slightly less knowledgeable than the law students,
149
despite the judges' average of fourteen years of law practice' 50 and twelve
years on the bench,15 ' and the experience of 76% of them as a prosecutor,
defense attorney, or both prior to becoming a judge. 52 In sum, when judges
exclude eyewitness experts due to their belief that jurors are knowledgeable
about eyewitness testimony, their rulings do not have a sound basis in
scientific fact.'
53
140 Id.; see also discussion supra note 64 (explaining the role of eyewitness confidence).
141 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 13.
142 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b.vi (providing that all the members of a lineup are
all presented at the same time in simultaneous lineup).
143 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 11; see also supra note 81.
144 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 14.
145 See, e.g., id. at 9-11.
146 Id. at 12. But see Kassin et al., supra note 138, at 1097.
147 Of the 160 judges surveyed, 142 were state judges, 10 were federal, 7 were retired,
and 1 was an Indian tribal judge. Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 7. There were 146 trial
judges, 6 appellate, and 8 (presumably including the retired judges) who did not indicate
their current position. Id. On average, the judges had practiced law for 13.96 years and had
been on the bench for 12.48 years. Id.
148 Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and Students
Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony 2 (Sept. 21, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
149 Id.
0 Id. at 7.
151 Id.
152 id.
153 See also Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 20, at 29 ("In conclusion, the.., data
refute the claim that expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identifications would not
tell the jury members anything they do not already know. Not only do jury members
overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications in target-present lineups, they also
appear unaware, to some extent, of the sources of error associated with this type of evidence.
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b. Traditional Legal Safeguards Are Sufficient to Guard Against
Eyewitness Error
As the statistical evidence in the introduction to this article
demonstrates, it is manifest that eyewitness error frequently occurs despite
the use of traditional legal safeguards. Modem psychological studies
illustrate the shortcomings of each safeguard.
i. Voir Dire
In criminal trials, the jurors must critically examine eyewitness
testimony for accuracy if they are to return a fair and impartial verdict.
54
Voir dire provides attorneys with the opportunity to eliminate jurors who
are unwilling to examine eyewitness testimony critically.' 55 For voir dire to
be an effective safeguard, it must satisfy two requirements: attorneys must
employ a jury selection strategy that enables them to accurately determine
which jurors are unwilling to examine eyewitness testimony critically,
156
and judges must permit attorneys to use such a strategy.157 Unfortunately,
empirical studies of attorneys' voir dire strategies reveal they are ineffective
in determining jurors' willingness to examine eyewitness testimony
critically, as the lawyers tend to employ simplistic profiles of jurors that
have little or no predictive validity in making this determination.
58
The scientific literature has demonstrated that the most effective means
to determine potential jurors' willingness to examine eyewitness testimony
critically is to ascertain their attitudes towards eyewitnesses.159 However,
even this method has proved insufficient.' 60  Moreover, even if attorneys
could develop an effective voir dire strategy, their attempts at obtaining
information regarding jurors' attitudes are often impeded by the constraints
courts place on attorneys' use of voir dire strategies and the limited role
Therefore, the.., data indicate that the testimony of an expert on these matters would not
invade the province of the jury. Rather, such testimony would aid the jury in its evaluation
of evidence and would thereby further the cause of justice.").
154 Douglas J. Narby & Brian L. Cutler, Effectiveness of Voir Dire as a Safeguard in
Eyewitness Cases, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 724 (1994) ("The fairness of the defendant's trial





158 Id. at 724-25.
9 Id. at 725.
160 Id. at 727 ("No evidence was found for a significant relation between attitudes toward
eyewitnesses and juror perception of culpability.").
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Although cross-examination is the most frequently used legal
safeguard and widely assumed to be effective, it is, in fact, an ineffectual
remedy for eyewitness error. 163 Three conditions would have to be met for
cross-examination to be an effective safeguard against erroneous eyewitness
testimony. 164 First, attorneys must have sufficient opportunity to identify
the many factors that may affect eyewitness accuracy. 165 Next, attorneys
must understand the effects of such factors. 166 Finally, jurors must know
how eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy, so they can
understand the implications of an attorney's cross-examination of an
eyewitness. 1
67
Defense attorneys typically do not have adequate opportunity in
criminal cases to become aware of the many factors that affect eyewitness
accuracy.168 Because defense attorneys are generally not present when a
crime occurs, they must obtain identification information from eyewitnesses
or law officers. 169 A defense attorney's ability to obtain this information
depends on the quality of the eyewitness's memory and his or her
willingness to cooperate with the defense attorney. 170  Most prosecution
161 Id. at 728.
162 Id.
163 Berman & Cutler, supra note 15, at 170. Dillickrath asserts that there are identifiable
weaknesses to cross-examination as a safeguard:
First, the typical eyewitness is sincerely convinced of her own sincerity. This is one reason why
expert testimony is frequently proffered: to ameliorate the impossibility of shaking the
unassailable confidence of a witness who believed in herself. In fact, Dr. Loftus [a prominent
eyewitness researcher] posits that traditional cross-examination may reinforce the jury's faith in
the eyewitness.
Moreover, eyewitnesses are frequently the victims of crimes and therefore subject to the
sympathies of the jury. Even where the witness is a bystander, the jury is generally more likely
to sympathize with her than with a hard-pressing lawyer using all the tricks in his repertoire to
damage the eyewitness's credibility.
Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1094.




161 Id. at 157.




eyewitnesses are unwilling to speak to a defense attorney about a crime. 171
Moreover, though defense attorneys can obtain copies of police reports,
they will often be useless since officers who prepare the reports are not
typically knowledgeable about eyewitness factors. 72 Furthermore, officers
are generally reluctant to put damaging information about the eyewitness in
a police report. 7 3 Finally, defense attorneys are usually not present at
identification procedures, 74 making it difficult to determine if a procedure
was suggestive. 75  Because defense attorneys do not have a sufficient
opportunity in criminal cases to gather information about problems that
may have affected eyewitness accuracy, cross-examination is not an
effective safeguard against eyewitness error.
Moreover, even if defense attorneys had adequate access to
information regarding eyewitness accuracy, they have limited knowledge of
eyewitness factors. 176 Thus, they are unlikely to ask appropriate questions
during the examination, choosing instead to focus on discrediting the
eyewitness rather than helping the jury to assess the eyewitness's
accuracy.177  Cross-examination tactics are also ineffective because they
generally involve showing a jury the peripheral inconsistencies in an
eyewitness's testimony,' 78  decreasing the eyewitness's level of
confidence, 79 and demonstrating the eyewitness's poor memory for minor
details. 180  These factors are not related to eyewitness accuracy, though
judges, attorneys, and jurors often believe they are.'
8 1
171 This assertion is based on Richard Wise's six years of experience as a criminal
prosecutor.
172 Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense:
Comparing Jurors, Judges, and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 115 (2006) (noting that there is a "large deficiency in knowledge
of eyewitness memory amongst.., law enforcement personnel").
173 See generally Penrod & Cutler, supra note 90, at 89-118.
174 CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 57, at 156; see also Veronica Stinson et al., How
Effective Is the Presence-of-Counsel Safeguard? Attorney Perceptions of Suggestiveness,
Fairness, and Correctability of Biased Lineup Procedures, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 64, 73
(1996) ("Attorneys reported that they were present at only 5% of their clients'
identifications, and we believe that these responses were based on both photoarray and
lineup identifications.").
175 CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 57, at 156.
176 Id. at 167; see also Devenport et al., supra note 137, at 340-43.
177 Leippe, supra note 88, at 923 (stating that attorneys concentrate on "destroy[ing]




181 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 8 ("Memory for minor or peripheral details is
inversely related to eyewitness accuracy, because an eyewitness who attends to peripheral
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Finally, even if defense attorneys were able to muster a cross-
examination that addressed the relevant psychological eyewitness factors,
as previously discussed, it is still unlikely that an effective examination
would alert juries and judges to the threat of eyewitness error. This is likely
to occur because most judges and jurors have limited knowledge of
eyewitness factors and thus are unlikely to give the risk of error proper
consideration during instructions and deliberations. 82 In sum, "[f]or even
the most skilled lawyer, cross-examination by itself is probably insufficient
to attack the problems of eyewitness identification.'
' 83
iii. Closing Argument
For similar reasons, closing argument is also an ineffective legal
safeguard against erroneous eyewitness testimony. 84  Even if attorneys
manage to plant a few seeds of doubt about an eyewitness's accuracy during
cross-examination, few of these attorneys are capable of reaping a harvest
of positive inferences at closing. 85 In sum, during closing argument most
attorneys cannot argue cogently why an eyewitness's testimony is
erroneous, nor would most jurors be able to comprehend such arguments
even if attorneys were capable of making them.' 
86
iv. Jury Instructions
In the past thirty years, both state and federal appellate courts have
encouraged trial court judges to use special instructions cautioning jurors
about the fallibility of eyewitness testimony. 87 The most widely used jury
instructions in the United States concerning eyewitness testimony are the
Telfaire instructions. 1 8 In United States v. Telfaire,189 the defendant was
convicted of robbery on the basis of the testimony of a single eyewitness
without any corroborating evidence. On appeal, the conviction was
details has fewer resources available to process the perpetrator's face."). In addition,
because memory is not like a video recording but is instead a reconstructive process, minor
inconsistencies in memory will occur even in accurate eyewitnesses. Id. at 15.
182 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 57, at 168.
183 Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1096.
184 Leippe, supra note 88, at 923.
185 See Dillickrath, supra note 102, at 1096.
186 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 57, at 186.
187 Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges' Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony,
14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 31, 33 (1996).
188 CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 57, at 255 (citing United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552 (D.C. Cir. 1972)); see also Ramirez et al., supra note 187, at 35.
189 469 F.2d 552.
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affirmed.' 90 Nonetheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled that a trial court must give a jury special
instructions on eyewitness testimony when the only evidence against the
defendant is a single eyewitness, even if the defense attorney has not
requested such an instruction.' 91  The appellate court then took the
opportunity to inform the trial court what instructions should be used in the
future for eyewitness testimony.
92
Several studies have tested the efficacy of jury instructions in
educating jurors about the effect of eyewitness factors on identification
accuracy. 93  For example, Ramirez and her associates conducted two
experiments on jury instructions. 194 In their first experiment, they tested the
effectiveness of the Telfaire instructions. 195  They showed participants a
brief but realistic simulation of a robbery trial.' 96  The primary evidence
against the defendant in the simulated trial was the testimony of the robbery
victim. 197 Participants viewed the victim's testimony under both poor and
good eyewitness conditions. 198 Also, the participants received the Telfaire
instructions at different stages of the trial.' 99
190 Id. at 558.
191 Id. at 555.
192 The Telfaire instructions primarily discuss the eyewitness factors that the United
States Supreme Court enumerated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), for assessing eyewitness accuracy. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at
558-59.
193 See Ramirez et al., supra note 187, at 34.
194 Id. at 31.
'9' Id. at 36.
196 Id. at 38.
197 id.
'9' Id. at 39.
In the poor eyewitnessing and identification condition, the eyewitness testified that: a) the robber
was wearing a hat that covered his hairline; b) the robber was waving a handgun throughout the
robbery; c) she had identified the robber in a lineup two weeks after the robbery had occurred;
and d) when viewing the lineup of suspects, the police led her to believe that the robber was in
the lineup. In contrast, in the good witnessing and identification condition, the eyewitness
testified that: a) the robber's face and hair were not concealed; b) the robber had a gun but kept it
hidden most of the time; c) she identified the robberjust two days after the robbery; and d) when
viewing the lineup of suspects, she was told that the robber may or may not be in the lineup. In
each condition, the police officer corroborated the eyewitness testimony concerning the lineup
procedure.
Id.
199 Id. There were four groups. One received the instructions at the beginning and end
of the trial, another only at the beginning, another only at the end, and a last control group
received no instructions at all. Id. at 37-38.
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The results of the first experiment showed that the Telfaire instructions
either did not affect or even decreased the participant's sensitivity to the
witnessing and identification conditions in the simulated trials, no matter
when they were given to the participants. 200 Furthermore, the participants
recalled on average only 31% of the elements of the Telfaire instructions,
even when they heard them twice. 20 1 Ramirez concluded: "[I]t appears that
Telfaire is not a reliable alternative to eyewitness expert testimony.,
202
The experiment was then repeated using three groups that received,
respectively, no instructions, the traditional Telfaire instructions, and
revised Telfaire instructions that simplified and improved their language
and organization.0 3 The new instructions also included explicit discussion
of thirteen eyewitness factors thought by most experts to affect
identification accuracy.20 4
The results of the experiment revealed that, though the participants
were able to recall more of the revised instructions, they did not improve
their sensitivity to the eyewitness and identification conditions, nor did they
substantially increase their knowledge of eyewitness factors.2 °5 The finding
of only a modest increase in knowledge, even for the revised instructions,
was consistent with other research that showed that jurors have difficulty
understanding jury instructions that conflict with their prior knowledge and
beliefs.20 6 For example, Smith found that jury instructions on the legal
definition of a crime were effective only when judges included a
supplementary instruction that attacked point-by-point jurors' mistaken
prior beliefs about that definition.20 7 Ramirez and her colleagues believed
that a similar refutation would be necessary to effect any improvement in
208jurors' grasp of jury instructions about eyewitness testimony. However,
they determined that such a change would be unlikely because of
disagreements on the part of judges as to the nature of laypersons'
200 Id. at 45.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 48. In the original experiment, the participants found the instructions to be "too
long, boring, repetitious, confusing, and hard to remember." Id. at 44.
204 Id. at 46-47.
205 Id. at 56.
206 Id. at 57.
207 Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the
Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 533 (1993).
208 Ramirez et al., supra note 187, at 58.
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misconceptions. 0 9 Accordingly, they concluded that "[g]iven this state, the




Additionally, jury instructions lack the flexibility and specificity of
expert testimony.2 1' It may be difficult to adapt them to the varying factual
patterns of individual criminal cases and to the continuously growing body
of scientific knowledge on eyewitness testimony.2t 2 Moreover, judges tend
to be very cautious in changing jury instructions, as verdicts are frequently
213
reversed on appeal due to improper jury instructions. In conclusion,
"judges' instructions do not serve as an effective safeguard against mistaken
identifications and convictions and. . . expert testimony is therefore more
effective than judges' instructions as a safeguard.,
21 4
v. Motions to Suppress Eyewitness Identifications
Research has shown that motions to suppress eyewitness
identifications, like the previously discussed legal safeguards, are also an
inadequate safeguard against eyewitness error.2 15 For example, Stinson and
her colleagues conducted a study to assess attorneys' knowledge of
eyewitness factors that affect the suggestibility and fairness of identification
procedures and their willingness to file motions to suppress identifications
when the procedures are unfair.216 The participants in the study were
ninety-seven public defenders who were shown one of eight videotaped
lineups that a female eyewitness had viewed.2 17  The videotaped lineups
varied as to whether they contained instruction bias, foil bias, presentation
bias, or some combination of these biases.21 8 A lineup contained biased
instructions if the eyewitness was not informed that the perpetrator might
not be in the lineup. 219 In the foil-biased lineups, the foils matched the
209 Id.
210 Id.
21 1 Richard A. Wise, A Survey of Judges' Knowledge of Eyewitness Testimony 116
(2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, The Catholic University of America).
212 Id.
213 Greene, supra note 14, at 261 (internal citations omitted).
214 CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 57, at 264.
215 Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the Motion-to-Suppress Safeguard? Judges'
Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairness of Biased Lineup Procedures, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 211 (1997); Stinson et al., supra note 174, at 64.
216 Stinson eta]., supra note 174, at 64.
217 Id. at 66-67. Originally 161 assistant public defenders were contacted to participate
in the study. A total of 109 public defenders agreed to participate in the study, but because
of various difficulties only 97 public defenders actually completed the study.
218 Id. at 67.
219 Id. at 65-67.
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eyewitness's descriptions of the perpetrator of the crime on no more than
two of five characteristics. 220 In the lineups that had presentation bias, the
lineup members were presented simultaneously rather than sequentially.
22'
After watching a videotaped lineup, the attorneys rated the suggestiveness
of the foils, instructions, presentation, and the overall fairness of the
lineup.2
The results of the study showed that the attorneys were sensitive to foil
bias, as they correctly concluded that the foil-biased lineups were both more
suggestive and less fair than the unbiased foil lineups.223 They were only
partially sensitive to instruction biases, perceiving them to be more
suggestive, but not less fair, than the instruction unbiased lineups.224 They
were completely insensitive to presentation bias, as they rated the sequential
lineups as significantly more suggestive and less fair than the simultaneous
lineups.225 The attorneys' ratings on presentation bias are contrary to
research that has demonstrated that sequential lineups significantly decrease
the number of erroneous eyewitness identifications compared to
simultaneous lineups.2 6
Building on this data, the Stinson study further established the lack of
reliability of motions to suppress as a means to address eyewitness error.
22 7
The researchers had the attorneys rate the suggestiveness and fairness of the
lineup, the probability that they would submit a motion to suppress the
identification, and the probability a judge would grant their motion.228 The
attorneys also rated the likelihood that they could convince a jury that the
identification presented at trial was inaccurate and that the given lineup was
suggestive.22 9 Only the attorneys who viewed the foil-biased lineups were
likely to submit a motion to suppress the identification.230
By contrast, when instruction and presentation bias were present in the
lineups, the attorneys were unlikely to submit a motion to suppress because
they did not believe a judge would grant such a motion, or that a jury could
220 Id.
221 Id. at 66-67. In a simultaneous lineup, the members are all presented to an eyewitness
at the same time. Id. at 66. In a sequential lineup, the members are presented individually.
Id. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b.vi.
222 Stinson et al., supra note 174, at 67-68.
223 Id. at 72.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b.vi.
227 See Stinson et al., supra note 174, at 71.
221 Id. at 67.
229 Id. at 68.
230 Id. at 71.
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be convinced of the inaccuracy of eyewitness identification or the
suggestiveness of the lineup. 231 The results of the study showed that not
only do attorneys have a limited knowledge of the biases that affect the
suggestibility and fairness of lineups, but that they also frequently believe
judges will disregard their concerns of bias.232
Stinson also determined if judges were sensitive to foil, instruction,
and presentation bias in lineups. 233 Ninety-nine Florida judges read a short
summary of a hypothetical robbery case that included an eyewitness's
identification of a suspect. 234  The case summary also contained the
eyewitness's description of the robbery and the perpetrator of the robbery, a
description of the identification procedure, a color photocopy of the lineup
members, and a motion to suppress the identification.235 The identification
procedures varied as to whether they contained foil, instruction, and
presentation bias.236 After reading the case summary and viewing the
photograph, the judges rated the suggestiveness of the foils, instruction, and
lineup presentation, and the overall fairness of the lineup.237 They also
238stated whether they would grant a motion to suppress. The result of the
study showed that the judges were sensitive to foil and instruction bias, but
were not sensitive to presentation bias.239
Taken together, these two studies of attorneys' and judges' sensitivity
to lineup biases indicate that motions to suppress identifications are an
inadequate safeguard against biased lineups. 240 Most attorneys and judges
have limited knowledge of the biases that indicate lineup suggestibility.24'
As a result, attorneys do not always submit motions to suppress
identifications when they are warranted, and judges do not always grant
motions to suppress when they should.242 Furthermore, the most common
231 Id. at 72.
232 Id. at 71-72.
233 Stinson et al., supra note 215, at 216.





239 Id. at 215. Although judges and attorneys demonstrated awareness of the foil bias in
the Stinson studies, it should not be assumed that they would demonstrate this awareness in
all circumstances. Foil bias is a complex phenomenon. See Wells et al., supra note 18, at
626-27. A small number of judges also indicated that they routinely deny motions to
suppress identifications and leave it to the jury to determine whether the identification
procedure was suggestive. Stinson et al., supra note 215, at 219.
240 Stinson et al., supra note 215, at 219.
241 Id. at 218.
242 Id. at 213-19.
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identification procedures are photo arrays and pre-indictment lineups.243 As
was stated previously, defendants do not have a right to have an attorney
present during these identification procedures.244 Consequently, even if
most attorneys were knowledgeable about the factors that create biased
lineups, their ability to remedy them would still be significantly impaired
because they are generally not present during most identification
procedures.245
c. The Eyewitness Expert's Testimony Would Prejudice the Jury and Usurp
Its Discretion
For over twenty-five years scientists have studied the influence of
expert testimony on jurors.246 After reviewing scientific studies on jurors'
ability to evaluate and make use of expert testimony, Vidmar and Diamond
arrived at the following conclusions:
It seems clear from this review that claims about jury incompetence and
irresponsibility in assessing and considering the testimony of scientific experts are not
supported by research findings. There is a consistent convergence in juror interview
studies and experimental studies involving both civil and criminal juries. Jurors
appear motivated to critically assess the content of the expert's testimony and weigh it
in the context of the other trial evidence, as they are instructed to do .... Rather than
simply deferring automatically to experts, as critics have claimed, the trial process
appears to make them aware of the fallibility of expert testimony. This is not to say
that every juror is motivated and grasps the expert testimony, because the data seldom
shed light on the thought processes of individual jurors, but the deliberation process
appears to result in closer examination of diverging views and understandings-just
as the legal system assumes it does.
247
Furthermore, the probability that eyewitness expert testimony will usurp the
function of the jury is reduced because eyewitness experts do not state
248whether a particular eyewitness has made an accurate identification.
Instead, experts inform the trier of fact which eyewitness factors may have
affected the witness's accuracy, and what the effect of those factors may
243 See id. at 218 ("The presence-of-counsel safeguard only applies to postindictment live
lineups, so defendants do not have the right to an attorney at photo lineups or showups,
which we found are the most common identification methods.").
244 Id. at 218-19.
245 Id. at 211.
246 Wells et al., supra note 18, at 604.




have been. 249  They generally leave it to the jury to apply the relevant
eyewitness factors in evaluating the accuracy of a specific eyewitness.25°
d. Eyewitness Expert Testimony Is Unnecessary When the Eyewitness Is a
Law Enforcement Officer or Someone Else Trained to Make Accurate
Identifications in Stressful Situations
Several courts have excluded eyewitness expert testimony when the
eyewitness is a law enforcement officer because they believe officers are
trained to make accurate identifications in stressful situations. 251 Empirical
research, however, has shown that law officers are no better at identifying
faces than lay eyewitnesses. 252 Studies indicate that people can be trained
to provide more detailed accounts of crimes and be less susceptible to the
effects of post-event misinformation.253 This is indeed true of law
enforcement officers. 4  However, the same studies reveal that people's
abilities to identify faces cannot be improved.255 In sum, courts should not
exclude eyewitness expert testimony because a law officer is the eyewitness
since the officer, in spite of his or her training, is no better at making
accurate identifications in stressful situations than is the lay eyewitness.
e. The Prejudicial Value of Eyewitness Expert Testimony Substantially
Outweighs Its Probative Value
With regard to jury prejudice, researchers primarily confront the issue
of whether expert testimony merely increases jurors' skepticism of
eyewitness testimony256 or increases their sensitivity to eyewitness
249 See id.
250 Courts are divided about whether it is permissible to ask eyewitness experts
hypothetical questions. Compare Johnson v. State, 526 S.E.2d 549, 553 n.3 (Ga. 2000), and
United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2001) (apparently approving
hypothetical questions), with State v. Fontaine, 382 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 1986) (not
permitting hypothetical questions). All courts prohibit eyewitness experts from giving an
opinion on the accuracy of a particular eyewitness's testimony. Johnson, 526 S.E.2d at 553
n.3; State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 804 (Ohio 1986). Courts prohibit expert opinions on
eyewitness accuracy because they consider them an invasion of the jury's province to
determine the credibility of eyewitnesses. FISHMAN, supra note 111, at § 14:79.
251 See supra note 85.




256 See Fredric D. Woocher, Legal Principles Governing Expert Testimony by
Experimental Psychologists, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 47 (1986) (noting "experimental
psychologist's impressive credentials might lead the jury to rely too heavily on her opinion
and therefore undervalue the weight of the eyewitness evidence").
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evidence.25 7  Sensitivity consists of two elements: knowledge and
integration. 8 Knowledge is defined as "awareness of the manner in which
a factor influences eyewitness memory, including the direction and
magnitude of the effect for a given factor., 259 Integration "refers to the
ability to render decisions that affect knowledge., 260 In other words, even
though jurors may know how an eyewitness factor affects eyewitness
accuracy, they may not incorporate that knowledge into their evaluation of
eyewitness accuracy.
In a series of studies, Cutler, Penrod, and their colleagues investigated
whether expert testimony increases jurors' sensitivity to eyewitness
testimony.2 61 In their first study, they showed 538 undergraduate mock
jurors262 videotapes of a realistic trial simulation of a liquor store robbery,
263
where the primary evidence was the robbery victims' identification of the
defendant. 2 4 In one version of the mock trial, an eyewitness expert who
had testified over fifty times in court played the role of the expert in the
simulated trial, and practicing attorneys played the role of the prosecutor
and defense attorney.265 In another version, no expert was presented.266
Instead, the attorneys reviewed the eyewitness factors relevant to the case
during closing arguments.267
Other variations on the videotaped trial were created. 268 The mock
jurors heard from the eyewitness that the crime occurred under either poor
or good eyewitness and identification conditions.269 In the trials, the victim
testified that she was either 80% or 100% confident that she had made an
accurate identification.270
The results of the experiment showed that expert testimony improved
mock juror sensitivity to the witness identification conditions when
rendering a verdict 271 and in evaluating the probability that the victim had
257 Cutler et al., supra note 119, at 312.
258 Id. at 313.
259 CUTLER& PENROD, supra note 57, at 217.
260 Id.
261 Cutler et al., supra note 119, at 311.
262 Id. at 318.
263 Id. at 316.
264 Id. at 317.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 316-17.
268 Id. at 317.
269 Id.
270 Id.




made an accurate identification. It also caused the mock jurors to place
less reliance on eyewitness's confidence when making inferences about
eyewitness credibility and the strength of the prosecution and defense
cases.
273
Cutler, Dexter, and Penrod, using the same paradigm that they used in
their prior experiment, determined what effects expert testimony would
have on experienced jurors.274 All of the experienced jurors in their study
had been called for or served on jury duty within a year of their
participation in the study.275 In addition, the responses of the experienced
jurors were both compared and combined with the responses of the 538
undergraduates who had acted as mock jurors in their prior study.2 76
The results revealed that, without expert testimony, both the
experienced jurors and the undergraduates were insensitive to witnessing
and identification conditions and unaware of the impact of eyewitness
confidence.277 Expert testimony sensitized both groups of participants to
witnessing and identification conditions.278 It also caused both groups of
participants to give less weight to eyewitness confidence when evaluating
the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the defendant's case.279
Furthermore, expert testimony did not increase the skepticism of either the
experienced jurors or the undergraduates.28°
Penrod and Cutler concluded in their most recent article:
In contrast to the poor effectiveness of attorney and juror, expert testimony appears to
be a promising adjunct to traditional safeguards. There is little evidence that jurors are
confused by the testimony, while research indicates that it has the salutary effect of
educating jurors about factors that influence eyewitness performance and enhances
their reliance on those factors when rendering decision. Furthermore, although
attorneys have presumably devoted many (fruitless) years to the task of honing skills
such as cross-examination of eyewitnesses, relatively little effort has been devoted to
finding forms of expert testimony that maximize the educational effects of this
testimony. Hence, it is likely that the full benefits of expert testimony about the
problem of eyewitness reliability have not yet been realized.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 323-24.
274 Brian L. Cutler et al., Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical
Analysis, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 215, 217 (1989).
275 Id. at 220.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 223.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id. The experienced jurors and undergraduates did not differ significantly in their
responses to expert testimony or to the absence of expert testimony. Id.
281 Penrod & Cutler, supra note 90, at 115.
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The results of several other studies on the effect of expert testimony,
however, indicate that, in some circumstances, expert testimony fails to
sensitize jurors to the effects of eyewitness factors and only produces
increased juror skepticism about eyewitness testimony. 282 For example,
Leippe and his colleagues conducted two experiments on the effects of
expert testimony. 83 In their first experiment, college students read a trial
transcript of a robbery/murder case.284 The trial transcript included opening
and closing arguments, judges' instructions, and direct and cross-
examination of the witnesses, including the only eyewitness to the crime.
281
In the different versions of the trial, the strength of the prosecution's case
was manipulated to make the prosecution's case either moderately strong or
moderately weak.286
Some of the trial transcripts included the testimony of an eyewitness
expert, who was called as the court's witness. 287 The expert's testimony
was introduced either before or after the prosecution presented its case. 288
In the jury instructions in the transcripts, the judge either did or did not
present a summary of the expert's testimony in those versions of the
289
transcript that included the expert's testimony.
The results of the first experiment showed that the only condition in
which expert testimony had an effect on jurors was when the testimony was
presented at the conclusion of the trial and the judge in jury instructions
summarized what the expert had said.29 ° In this condition, the expert's
testimony significantly lowered the mock jurors' perceptions of the guilt of
the defendant and the credibility of the eyewitness.29'
Furthermore, these lowered perceptions were present whether the
prosecution had a moderately strong or weak case.292 The researchers
stated that "[t]aken together, these aspects are somewhat disconcerting in
that they suggest that general, educational testimony about eyewitness
psychology may work in the defense's favor (i.e., a pro-defense
282 Michael R. Leippe et al., Timing of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, Jurors' Need for
Cognition, and Case Strength as Determinants of Trial Verdicts, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
524, 525 (2004).
283 Id. at 529, 535.






290 Id. at 534.
291 id.
292 Id. at 535.
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asymmetry), even when it perhaps should not (i.e., an otherwise strong
prosecution case). 293
In a second experiment, Leippe and his colleagues strengthened the
prosecution's case with stronger physical and circumstantial evidence and
used only two conditions: the strengthened prosecution case without expert
testimony, and the strengthened case with expert testimony, together with a
jury instruction from the judge that summarized the expert's testimony.
294
The expert was again called as the court's witness in the trial
transcripts.295 The expert testimony in the second experiment decreased the
credibility of the eyewitness and the likelihood of a guilty verdict, despite
the relatively strong prosecution evidence.29 6 The researchers concluded:
This result gives some credence to the concern that eyewitness expert testimony can
have the unwanted effect of creating sufficient juror skepticism about the entire case
that leads to an acquittal in the face of strong circumstantial evidence. To be sure, we
have yet to test for this impact of expert testimony in an extremely strong prosecution
case, and it can be argued that an increase in overall skepticism in a moderately strong
case is not so inappropriate. Yet, if our results do reflect a tendency that extends to
strong extra-eyewitness cases in general, it puts the onus on judges to decide whether
to admit eyewitness expert testimony in light of how much other incriminating
evidence besides the eyewitness(es) that the prosecution is prepared to offer.
297
In addition to those concerns previously discussed, there are other
limitations to eyewitness expert testimony. Considering the large number
of cases in which eyewitness expert testimony is needed, it is doubtful that
judges will be willing to authorize payment for expert testimony for all the
indigent defendants who could benefit from it.2 98 Finally, even if cost was
not a concern, there are an insufficient number of eyewitness experts
available to testify in all criminal cases where eyewitness identification
299
accuracy is an issue.
Although it is likely that in the future scientists will be able to
significantly increase both the effectiveness of expert testimony and more
accurately predict the circumstances when it is or is not effective, more
research is needed to accomplish these goals. In light of the current




296 Id. at 535-36.
297 Id. at 538.
298 The Supreme Court requires the State to pay for expert testimony for indigent
defendants where the denial of such assistance would otherwise violate his or her due
process rights. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985).
299 Wells et al., supra note 18, at 609.
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eyewitness testimony is the sole or primary evidence against a defendant.
In other cases, admission of expert testimony should be left to the discretion
of the trial judge. When eyewitness testimony is the sole or primary
evidence against the defendant, the admission of expert testimony is
necessary because it is in these cases that the risk of wrongful conviction is
highest, and it makes jurors aware of the many factors that affect
eyewitness accuracy. It is also needed because the effect of many
eyewitness factors on identification accuracy is not a matter of common
sense.
Expert testimony is a flawed but necessary component of the solution
to the problems of eyewitness testimony. In light of its shortcomings, the
tripartite solution recognizes the need for additional measures to effect a
comprehensive solution.
B. SECOND COMPONENT OF THE TRIPARTITE SOLUTION: IMPROVING
PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTING EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE BY
CONDUCTING EYEWITNESS INTERVIEWS AND IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH BEST PRACTICES
IDENTIFIED BY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE FIELD
"It is incredible that we know with scientific certainty that some common methods the
police use run unnecessary risks of false identifications," said Dr. Gary Wells, a




Up to this point, this article has addressed the deficiencies in courts'
responses to the problem of eyewitness error. The genesis of eyewitness
error, however, occurs long before litigation commences. It begins with the
collection of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement officials. Research
has shown that one of the key components to reducing eyewitness error is to
conduct interviews of eyewitnesses in a manner that maximizes the amount
of information obtained from them and that avoids contaminating their
memory of the crime. 30 1 The second component of the tripartite solution-
improving the collection of eyewitness evidence through the use of sound
300 Goleman, supra note 3, at Cl, C7. It is important to address the problems with these
methods because "[i]nformation obtained from witnesses is typically assigned great
importance in criminal investigations." Ivar A. Fahsing et al., The Man Behind the Mask:
Accuracy and Predictors of Eyewitness Offender Descriptions, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 722,
722 (2004).
301 Ronald P. Fisher, Interviewing Victims and Witnesses of Crime. 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y
& L.732, 752 (1995).
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psychological techniques, such as the cognitive interview-endeavors to
address this pressing problem.
In interviewing eyewitnesses, law enforcement officers generally make
three types of errors: (I) they fail to obtain much of the information that an
eyewitness knows about a crime; (2) they contaminate the eyewitness's
memory of the crime; and (3) they succumb to systemic pressures which
either motivate law officers to gather evidence with a pro-prosecution bias
or charge the least experienced officers with gathering the most important
evidence. 30 2 The reasons for each of these errors are discussed below.
a. Techniques Which Promote Incomplete Recollection
Law officers make many mistakes that impede their ability to obtain
the maximum amount of information from eyewitnesses.30 3 First, they
frequently interrupt eyewitnesses' narratives of the crime, which disrupts
memory and inhibits them from volunteering information.30 4 This renders
the accuracy and completeness of the interview dependent on the law
officer asking the right questions, which is difficult because each crime
contains unique features that cannot be anticipated.30 5
Furthermore, most law officers ask closed-ended questions, that is,
questions that ask for specific information,30 6 and provide the eyewitnesses
with insufficient time to complete their responses. 30 7 Open-ended questions
are superior in facilitating communication and giving the eyewitness
control. They also furnish the eyewitness with the best opportunity to fully
disclose relevant details of the crime.30 8 In addition, law officers should
allow for pauses when an eyewitness stops talking before asking the next
question, thus ensuring that an eyewitness has completed his or her
response.3 °9 Moreover, law enforcement officers all too frequently fail to
provide assistance to witnesses traumatized by recalling the circumstances
302 Id. at 753-56; Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 247, 250, 252-53
(2000).
303 Fisher, supra note 301, at 732.
304 Id. at 735.
305 See id.
306 For example, "What color was the car?" See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF




309 Id. at 17.
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of a crime. 310 As will be discussed, such assistance could take the form of
employing mnemonic devices from the cognitive interview that enhance
recall, 311 or could simply involve the officer lending sympathy and support
to a distraught witness.312 Numerous studies show that the "aroused"
eyewitness, or the eyewitness who feels personally threatened by the crime,
has reduced accuracy.313
Another major error made by most law officers is that their questions
are often incompatible with the "witness's mental representation of the
crime. '314 Because each eyewitness's mental representation of a crime is
unique, law officers need to ask questions that are compatible with the
eyewitness's memory of the crime rather than asking the eyewitness a
standard set of questions.315
Interviews of eyewitnesses also fail to elicit as much information as
possible because law officers are rarely clear in their expectations for
witnesses.316 For example, they fail to communicate to eyewitnesses the
type and degree of detail of information they require.317  Finally, as
previously stated, law officers lack knowledge of eyewitness factors, and in
particular, tend to overestimate the accuracy of eyewitnesses and are
unaware of how memory works.318 For all these reasons, law officers tend
to obtain incomplete accounts of crimes from eyewitnesses.
b. Techniques Which Tend to Contaminate Eyewitnesses' Memories of
Crimes
Perhaps a more pernicious error made by law officers is the use of
interrogation techniques which contaminate eyewitnesses' memories of
crimes. The primary vehicle for this error is giving a witness post-event
information; in other words, conveying to the witness information culled
not from his or her memory of the incident, but from other sources.319
Post-event information can come from many different sources such as other
eyewitnesses, law officers, or the media and can pertain either to the details
310 Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of
Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 581, 583 (2000).
311 See id. at 745-47; see also discussion infra Part IV.B. .d.
312 Deffenbacher, supra note 66, at 388.
313 Id.
314 Fisher, supra note 301, at 735.
315 Id.; Wells et al., supra note 310, at 583.
316 Fisher, supra note 301, at 747.
317 Id.
318 See id. at 736.
319 See id. at 740.
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of the crime or to the perpetrator's appearance. 320  Post-event information
will often seem credible to eyewitnesses, 321 and can alter their subsequent
responses to questions about an event they witnessed.322 When this occurs,
eyewitnesses' later responses to questions are likely to incorporate the false
presuppositions of the earlier questions.323 For instance, eyewitnesses tend
to incorporate another eyewitness's erroneous description of a person's face
into their own description, even when reconstructing the suspect's face with
an Identi-kit. 324  Moreover, post-event information not only affects
eyewitnesses' memory of the crime but also their ability to recognize the
perpetrator of the crime.325
Christiaansen, Sweeney, and Ochalek found that information
introduced after an eyewitness has observed a person could have a
significant effect on the eyewitness's estimate of the person's height and
weight.326 "The results of this, and the other studies, emphasize the extent
to which remembering is a complex reconstructive process and not a literal
record of an actual event." 327 In sum, memory does not permanently store
320 Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 14 ("Such 'post-event suggestions' may come from
overhearing the recall of other witnesses or from questioning by field officers investigating
the crime, and may involve aspects of the situation or facial characteristics of the suspect.").
321 See Fisher, supra note 301, at 740.
322 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Make-Believe Memories, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 867,867 (2003).
323 See id. at 867-68. In other words, when law officers, prosecutors, and others ask an
eyewitness a question that contains incorrect information, the incorrect information in the
question can alter the eyewitness's memory of the crime and ability to correctly identify the
perpetrator of the crime.
324 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be
Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 323 (1980).
The Identi-kit contains transparent line drawings of numerous alternatives of different facial
features (forehead and hairline, eyes, nose, chin, mouth, facial hair, glasses, etc.). Subjects
examined the features and selected those that seemed most like the ones of the face they were
attempting to put together. When they were satisfied that a good likeness had been achieved, the
composite was mounted on a white board and photographed.
Id. at 325-26. Deffenbacher has opined that Identi-kit identifications might be especially
prone to difficulty because "they require the witness to retrieve from memory isolated facial
features, a particularly difficult task, given that faces are quite likely stored as integrated
wholes." Deffenbacher, supra note 66, at 385.
325 Loftus & Greene, supra note 324, at 333 ("The verbal expressions and other
postevent information to which a witness is exposed will not only appear in the verbal
reports of witnesses but will also influence future recognition of persons who have been seen
before.").
326 Robert E. Christiaansen et al., Influencing Eyewitness Descriptions, 7 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 59, 64 (1983).
327 Id. at 64-65.
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precise records of all our experiences, but rather it is a highly malleable and
reconstructive process.328
Contamination from post-event information is most likely to occur
when the source of the post-event information is highly credible,
uncertainty surrounds the event, and tne post-event information concerns
peripheral details. 329  There are many reasons why interviews of
eyewitnesses by law officers meet these criteria. For instance, eyewitnesses
frequently view law officers as trustworthy authority figures. 330 "The social
demand characteristics of the situation provide some motivation for the
witness to accept information provided by the interviewer and to proffer
responses the witness believes will please the interviewer." 33' There is
often uncertainty surrounding the commission of a crime.332 Much of the
post-event information provided to an eyewitness may concern peripheral
details, such as a description of the perpetrator of the crime, and how the
crime occurred. 333  Law officers can convey post-event information to
eyewitnesses in a variety of ways, from overtly volunteering information to
the eyewitness, 334 to asking leading questions, 335 to encouraging guessing
by the eyewitness,
336 to offering confirming feedback.
337
Post-event information distorts an eyewitness's memory of the
crime338 and also increases his or her confidence in the accuracy of that
328 Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 20, at 20 ("[R]esearch has demonstrated that prior
knowledge affects the ways by which information is encoded and retrieved, often resulting in
distortions in recall arising from constructive processes at time of acquisition and/or from
reconstructive processes at the time of recall.").
329 Judges, supra note 302, at 247. Judges cites a law enforcement officer as an example
of a highly credible source. Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.; see also Lynn Garrioch & C. A. Elizabeth Brimacombe, Lineup Administrators'
Expectations: Their Impact on Eyewitness Confidence, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299, 306
(2001) ("We suggest that informational social influence can explain our results. To reduce
the uncertainty surrounding the choosing of a lineup member, witnesses may have looked to
their interviewer to help them decide if they were correct and then used the interviewer's
reaction to their lineup choice to gauge their identification confidence.").
332 Judges, supra note 302, at 247.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 248.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Bradfield et al., supra note 15, at 119. Such feedback could be verbal or as simple as
a smile. Garrioch & Brimacombe, supra note 331, at 300.
338 Judges, supra note 302, at 266; see also Bradfield et al., supra note 15, at 119
(finding that confirming feedback "distorted participants' recollection of events that occurred
before feedback was given").
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memory.339  Scientific studies show that post-event information has its
greatest impact on an eyewitness's confidence for inaccurate information.34 °
Post-event information also significantly compromises the trier of fact's
ability to ascertain the truth in a criminal trial.
c. Systemic Pressures That Either Motivate Law Officers to Gather
Evidence with a Pro-Prosecution Bias or Charge the Least Experienced
Officers with Gathering the Most Important Evidence
Moreover, law enforcement bodies not only permit, but may encourage
their officers, either overtly or covertly, to take the opportunity to
manipulate eyewitnesses' recollections. 34' Law officers work for the
prosecution in criminal cases and therefore are primarily motivated to
convict defendants rather than to exonerate them.342  Moreover, once
officers have identified a suspect they believe committed the crime, they
tend to conduct interviews of eyewitnesses with the goal of obtaining
further corroborating evidence of the suspect's guilt, ignoring exonerating
evidence.343 Law officers often interview eyewitnesses in the same manner
they interview suspects. 344 This aggressive style can convert an eyewitness
into a hostile witness who is unlikely to volunteer information.345
The final systemic factor that interferes with law officers' effective
interviewing of eyewitnesses is that novice patrol officers responding to
339 Judges, supra note 302, at 249-50.
340 Id.
341 See id. at 253 (describing an "adversarial, politically influenced system that provides
strong external incentives to obtain convictions").
342 Fisher, supra note 301, at 754; see also Dripps, supra note 8, at 639 ("[T]he pressure
to obtain a conviction in a high-profile rape or homicide case might tempt police and
prosecutors to look hard for ways to pin the offense on some luckless innocent.").
343 Fisher, supra note 301, at 754.
344 Id. at 755 ("[Law officers] sometimes generalize the interrogation skills to interviews
with cooperative witnesses.").
345 Id. at 755. Fisher further states that:
[An] institutional factor that militates against effective interviewing is a general ambience within
the police world of the police officer as a macho individual. Police are described as markedly
self-assertive and concerned with maintaining a virile self-image. One is easily convinced of this
by a casual observation of the number of ex-athletes in the police department and by the
excessive concern with body building specifically directed with muscularity and not general
fitness. To the degree that the macho ideal promotes an aggressive attitude, it detracts from
conducting effective interviews with cooperative witnesses.
Id. at 756 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Fisher continues: "Relatedly, I have
found in the various interviewing workshops I have conducted that women were generally
more effective interviewers than men." Id.
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346emergencies conduct the initial interview of most eyewitnesses. Not only
do these officers lack training and experience in interviewing eyewitnesses,
but they also conduct the interviews under poor conditions.347
Furthermore, though detectives have more time to interview
eyewitnesses, and do so under less stressful circumstances, their follow-up
interviews are also ineffective because they employ the same techniques
they learned when they were patrol officers. 348 The systemic problems that
interfere with law officers conducting effective interviews can only be
solved by better training and by limiting the interviewing of eyewitnesses to
officers who have the necessary interpersonal skills and personality traits to
be good interviewers.349
d. Improving the Collection of Eyewitness Evidence Through the Use of
Sound Psychological Techniques, Such as the Cognitive Interview
Psychologists have proposed a number of measures to improve
eyewitness interviews. For instance, Fisher proposed two solutions to
increase law officers' ability to conduct effective eyewitness interviews.350
First, law officers who interview eyewitnesses should not know the identity
of the suspect to prevent them from biasing eyewitnesses' responses to
incriminate the suspect.351 Second, law officers should permit defense
attorneys to be present during interviews or videotape interviews of
eyewitnesses, so that defense attorneys, judges, and juries can be informed
of improprieties that occur during interviews.35 2
However, perhaps chief among these psychological measures to
improve evidence gathering is the cognitive interview. 353  In the 1980s,
Ronald Fisher and Ed Geiselman began developing an interviewing
technique which greatly enhances the recollection and reporting of
eyewitnesses without contaminating their memory of the crime.354 This
346 Id. at 756.
141 Id. ("[T]heir interviews are conducted under the worst conditions imaginable: general
confusion and background noise, high witness arousal, severe time pressure, etc. They are
pressed by their superiors to file their reports quickly, even if at the cost of diminished
information.").
348 See id. at 757 (discussing difficulty in changing interview habits of experienced but
improperly trained police). Fisher further comments that he finds it easier to teach cognitive
interviewing skills to his research assistants than experienced police detectives. Id.
141 See id. at 757-58.
350 Id. at 754-55.
351 Id. at 754.
352 Id. at 755.
353 See Wells et al., supra note 310, at 583.
354 Id. at 582-83.
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"cognitive interview" was based on principles of cognitive and related
fields of psychology.355 The purpose of the cognitive interview is to
improve the standard law enforcement interview in three ways.356 First, the
cognitive interview takes into consideration the social dynamics of the
interviewing process by encouraging the law officer to establish rapport
with and show empathy for the eyewitness.357  Further, it enhances the
eyewitness's memory of the crime and the interviewer's recall of the
contents of the interview by applying basic principles of memory, using
mnemonic devices, 358 and by recording the interview. 359  Finally, it
improves communications between the eyewitness and the interviewer by
such means as asking open-ended questions and not interrupting the
eyewitness in his or her account of the crime.36°
To maximize the amount of information they obtain, law officers need
to develop rapport and show empathy for eyewitnesses because
eyewitnesses are frequently traumatized by the crimes they observe.361
Rapport and empathy also facilitate eyewitness cooperation, comfort, and
ease in disclosing information. 362 The cognitive interview accomplishes
these tasks by requiring the interviewer to express sympathy and concern
for the eyewitness, personalize the interview to the witness's unique needs,
use frequent open-ended questions, and not interrupt the eyewitness.363 The
cognitive interview emphasizes the importance of maintaining rapport with
an eyewitness throughout the entire criminal process and not just at the
initial interview. 36
Next, the cognitive interview enhances an eyewitness's recollection of
a crime through promoting basic principles of memory: First, that "the





359 See Fisher, supra note 301, at 745.
360 See Wells et al., supra note 310, at 582-83.
361 See id.
362 See id. (advocating the establishment of rapport with witnesses to allow them to talk
freely about their experiences). See also Fisher, supra note 301, at 756 ("As a means of
combating the stereotype of the aggressive person as the ideal, police should attempt to
promote values of the compassionate person or the good companion as the ideal police
officer, at least for those whose primary role is to conduct interviews with cooperative
witnesses.").
363 See id. (discussing common errors in a normal police interview).
364 See also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 306, at 15, 18, which is based in large
part on the cognitive interview where it emphasizes rapport building at every stage of the
interviewing process.
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with the encoded event. 3 65 Second, "[t]hat information not accessible with
one retrieval cue may be accessible with a different cue. 366
The cognitive interview provides several mnemonic devices to
improve an eyewitness's memory of the crime. These devices include
asking the eyewitness to recreate the context of the crime with specificity
and requesting that the eyewitness recall everything he or she can remember
about the crime, even if the eyewitness believes it is unimportant.
367
Additional devices include requesting that the interviewee remember the
crime in different orders, describe the events from a variety of perspectives,
and communicate through nonverbal means, such as drawings or gestures,
if that promotes memory. 368 The cognitive interview also enhances an
eyewitness's concentration while remembering the crime through
minimizing distractions and following a slower pace with a greater
proportion of open-ended questions.369  The interview concludes by
encouraging the eyewitness to contact the interviewer with any additional
information recalled later.370  The memory of the law officer is also
improved by recording the interview.
Numerous laboratory studies of the cognitive interview demonstrated
that it increases the amount of information elicited from eyewitnesses by
35% to 75% over standard police interviews. 372 Two field studies of the
cognitive interview in the United States and England, with victims and
365 Ronald P. Fisher et al., Improving Eyewitness Testimony with the Cognitive Interview,
in ADULT EYEwITNESS TESTIMONY 245, 246 (David Frank Ross et al. eds., 1994) (citations
omitted). A retrieval cue is a stimulus that helps an individual to remember an event. The
best retrieval cues are those cues that were present when the event occurred. Psychologists
refer to this empirical finding as the encoding specificity principle. This is why law officers
sometimes take an eyewitness back to the scene of the crime or show them an object that
was present during the crime such as the perpetrator's clothing. The encoded event refers to
the stored memory of the event that the person is attempting to retrieve (i.e., the crime). See
WAYNE WEITEN, PSYCHOLOGY: THEMES AND VARIATIONS 279 (7th ed. 2007).
366 Fisher et al., supra note 365, at 245-46.
367 Judges, supra note 302, at 251 (citations omitted).
368 Id.
369 Fisher, supra note 301, at 752. "[E]rror rates in recall can be reduced if leading
questions are avoided." Deffenbacher, supra note 66, at 385 (citation omitted). The
cognitive interview further aids the interviewer in obtaining the maximum amount of
information possible from an eyewitness by giving the interviewer a planned sequence for
conducting the interview. The planned sequence consists of a rapport building stage, an
open narration stage, a probing stage, a review stage, and a closing stage. Judges, supra note
302, at 251. Deffenbacher also supports the use of an open narration phase. Deffenbacher,
supra note 66, at 384-85.
370 See also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 306, at 20.
371 Fisher, supra note 301, at 745.
372 Wells et al., supra note 310, at 584 (citation omitted).
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eyewitnesses of real crimes, also demonstrated that the cognitive interview
produces significantly more information than the standard law enforcement
interview.373 The cognitive interview, unlike the standard law enforcement
interview, has the added benefit of not artificially increasing eyewitness
confidence.
374
In sum, law enforcement officers' use of psychologically sound
interviewing techniques, such as the cognitive interview, are essential to
reducing eyewitness error. Such techniques maximize the amount of
information obtained from eyewitnesses, do not contaminate their memory
of the crime, and prevent the artificial increase of their confidence.
2. Identification Procedures
Legal scholars and agencies have wrangled for decades with the
challenge of developing effective guidelines for identification
procedures. 375 Despite these attempts, procedures continue to be flawed.
376
Prior efforts have been ineffective because they failed to sufficiently base
their recommendations on scientific research, which has established several
scientific principles relevant to fair identification procedures.
377
171 Id. (by 55% in the United States and 35% in England).
374 Fisher, supra note 301, at 752.
375 For an excellent discussion of the history of these efforts, see Wells et al., supra note
310, at 581-82. The efforts culminated, to some extent, in 1999 with the Department of
Justice's publication of the "Guide," the first national guidelines. In testimony to the
importance of using scientific research in formulating guidelines for the collection of
eyewitnesses, the Guide stated:
This Guide is supported by social science research. During the past 20 years, research
psychologists have produced a substantial body of findings regarding eyewitness evidence.
These findings offer the legal system a valuable body of empirical knowledge in the area of
eyewitness evidence. This Guide makes use of psychological findings, either by including them
in the procedures themselves or by using them to point the way to the design and development of
further improvements in procedures and practices for possible inclusion in future amendments or
revisions to this document.
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 1-2 (1999).
376 See Wells et al., supra note 310, at 582.
377 See, e.g., Mark R. Phillips et al., Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as a
Safeguard Against Investigator Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 940, 940 (1999) ("Legal
psychologists have long recognized the potential for bias in such a procedure, which has
made eyewitness identification one of the most-studied and best-understood areas in all of
applied psychology.").
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a. The Scientific Principles Relevant to Fair Identification Procedures
i. Once a Mistake Is Made in an Identification Procedure, It Cannot Be
Corrected
Koehnken, Malpass, and Wolgater emphasized that:
Valid implementation of eyewitness identification using lineups and photo spreads
demands especially careful preparation. An identification of a suspect under
suggestive conditions early in an investigation cannot simply be rectified by later
conducting a fair lineup. Various psychological mechanisms result in the witness
retaining the effects of errors made in previous recognition tests. There are no
procedures that can reliably rule out the possibility that earlier mistakes will be
maintained at a later identification.
378
ii. Eyewitnesses Tend to Use a Relative Judgment Process in Making an
Identification
There is strong empirical evidence that most eyewitnesses employ a
relative judgment process in selecting a suspect from a photo array or a
lineup.379 In other words, eyewitnesses tend to select the lineup member
who most closely resembles the perpetrator of the crime. 380  When an
eyewitness employs an absolute judgment process, the eyewitness identifies
a lineup member because her appearance matches the eyewitness's memory
of the perpetrator of the crime and not because she most closely resembles
the perpetrator. 38 1  Studies indicate that promoting absolute judgments
rather than relative judgments in eyewitnesses would lead to more accurate
identification.382
There are several reasons why eyewitnesses tend to make a relative
rather than an absolute judgment when selecting a suspect in an
identification procedure. First, eyewitnesses logically assume that law
enforcement officials would not conduct an identification procedure if they
did not have a suspect.383 Many eyewitnesses feel under great pressure
from law officers, friends, family, or themselves to make an
identification.384 If an eyewitness cannot make an identification, he might
378 Gunter Koehnken et al., Forensic Applications of Line-Up Research, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 205, 208 (Siegfried Ludwig Sporer
et al. eds., 1996).
379 Wells et al., supra note 310, at 585-86.
380 Id. at 585.
31 Id. at 586.
382 See Koch, supra note 46, at 1104-05.
383 See Wells et al., supra note 18, at 630.
384 Brigham et al., supra note 5, at 15.
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feel like a failure.385 Thus, the witness will be looking to make an
affirmative identification and will select the lineup member who is closest
to her recollection of the perpetrator. 386  "Those who reported using a
relative judgment process were more likely to have made a false
identification than were those who reported using an absolute judgment
process.387
iii. The Lineup-as-Experiment Analogy
Garrioch and Brimacombe clarify why it is important for law officers
to conduct fair and impartial identification procedures:
Like a researcher with a specific hypothesis (i.e., that a particular lineup member is
the suspect), the detective is now in a position to exert tremendous influence in
administering the lineup .... A lineup administrator's knowledge of the suspect's
identity can increase the likelihood that the witness will identify the suspect.
388
To understand what safeguards are necessary to minimize erroneous
eyewitness identifications, it is useful to view identification procedures as
experiments.389 Wells and his colleagues explain how identification
procedures resemble experiments:
[T]he police have a hypothesis (that the suspect is the culprit); they collect materials
that could be used to test the hypothesis (e.g., picture of the suspect and filler
pictures), they create a design (e.g., placing suspect's picture in a particular position in
an array), instruct the subject(s) (eyewitness or eyewitnesses); run the procedure
(show the lineup to the eyewitness), record the data (identification of the suspect or
not); and interpret the hypothesis in light of the data (decide whether the identification
decision changes their assessment of whether the suspect is the culprit).
390
The lineup-as-experiment analogy allows us to identify procedural
errors that are likely to cause erroneous identifications. 391 They include:
385 Koehnken et al., supra note 378, at 208-09.
Under these circumstances, an "ideal" witness would realize that he or she cannot remember any
more and therefore, cannot recognize any of the individuals present in the line-up.
Unfortunately, we are not always dealing with ideal witnesses. A witness may want to present
him or herself as a "good," constructive person, who can help the police catch the offender and
thereby solve the crime. Sometimes witnesses feel themselves to be "failures" when they cannot
recall what the offender looked like.
Id.
386 Wells et al., supra note 310, at 586.
387 Wells et al., supra note 18, at 617.
388 Garrioch & Brimacombe, supra note 33 1, at 300 (internal citations omitted).
389 See Wells et al., supra note 18, at 617-18.
390 Id. at 618.
391 id.
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[T]he presence of demand characteristic (e.g., pressuring the eyewitness to make a
choice), the influence of confirmation biases (e.g., asking the eyewitness specifically
about the suspect while not asking those same questions about the distractors), the
facilitation of response biases (e.g., encouraging a loose recognition criterion
threshold in the eyewitness), making inferences from small sample sizes (e.g., making
strong judgments of validity based on only one eyewitness), not using control groups
(e.g., failing to see if people who did not witness the crime [but who have the
eyewitness's description of the perpetrator] can identify the suspect), selective
recording and interpretation of data (e.g., finding significance in an identification of
the suspect, but ignoring the outcome if the eyewitness makes a non-identification),
leaking of the hypothesis (e.g., making it obvious to the eyewitness which person in
the lineup is the suspect), and a host of other possible confounds.
392
In summary, the lineup-as-experiment analogy makes clear that it is
essential to conduct identification procedures in a manner that ensures that
the eyewitness identification of the suspect is a result of her memory of the
crime and not the manner in which the identification procedure was
conducted.39 3
Moreover, eyewitness evidence should be viewed as a type of physical
trace evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA, and firearm patterns.394 Like
other trace evidence, it has a physiological basis and its validity depends on
the proper use of scientific procedures in collecting the evidence.395
Accordingly, eyewitness evidence, like other types of trace evidence,
should be admitted at trial only if proper scientific procedures are followed
in producing it.
396
392 Id. Among other concerns, Wells and his colleagues highlight in this passage the use
of "mock witnesses" as a solution to the problem of biased lineups: "Mock witnesses are
people who have never seen the culprit but are given the eyewitness's verbal description of
the culprit, shown a picture of the lineup or photospread, and asked to select the person they
think is the suspect in the case." Id. at 631.
393 See Koehnken et al., supra note 378, at 211.
Assume, for example, that the suspect was the only person in the line-up wearing handcuffs.
Under such circumstances the possibility exists that an eyewitness identifies the suspect even if
he or she were completely innocent, simply because the fact that a person is wearing handcuffs
strongly implies that this is the suspect. Thus, the identification response may not be determined
by the similarity between the eyewitness's image of the criminal in memory and the appearance
of the suspect presented in the line-up but instead by inferences drawn from the line-up
procedure.
Id.
394 See Wells et al., supra note 18, at 618.
'9' See id. at 618-19.
396 See id. at 619.
Some forms of forensic evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA, and firearms pattems, are subject to
criticism for not following scientific principles in the collection and analysis of the evidence.
We see no reason why eyewitness identification evidence should not be treated in a similar




Of all the factors that predict eyewitness accuracy, researchers have
devoted the most attention to the effects of eyewitness confidence.397 There
are several reasons for the large number of studies on eyewitness
confidence. First, it is one of the five factors that the United States
Supreme Court enumerated in Neil and Manson that jurors must consider in
evaluating the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.398 Next, scientific studies
have shown that it is the single most important factor to jurors in judging
whether an eyewitness has made an accurate identification.399 It also seems
intuitively logical that if an eyewitness is confident of his identification, the
eyewitness is more likely to be accurate at trial. Unfortunately, empirical
research does not support this conclusion.400 Several studies have identified
post-event factors that significantly increase the confidence, but not the
accuracy, of eyewitness testimony.4 1  These factors include post-event
questioning, confirming feedback,402  and repeating questions of
witnesses.40 3 Thus, by the time of trial, eyewitness confidence has little
probative value in assessing eyewitness accuracy because of the many
factors that affect eyewitness confidence but not accuracy.40 4
useful. Eyewitness evidence can be construed as a type of trace evidence except that, unlike
blood or fingerprints, the trace is in the brain of a human observer in a form of a memory. This
memory trace even has some physical properties in the sense of being located as a neurological
trace in the brain. Like physical evidence, the critical issue is how to extract the evidence in a
way that is maximally diagnostic of identity.
Id. at 618-19.
'9' Id. at 619.
398 Id.
399 Id. at 620.
400 Id. at 625-26.
However, the studies of the confidence-accuracy relation and the studies of confidence
malleability show that high confidence does not necessarily denote high accuracy and that high
levels of confidence can come from external sources, such as giving a witness feedback about
their choices or information about the behavior of other eyewitnesses.
Id. at 626.
401 John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can
Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629, 630 (1996).
402 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b.x.
403 Id.
404 See discussion supra Part III.B.
2007]
WISE, DA UPHINAIS & SAFER
b. Guidelines for Conducting Identification Procedures
Based on the foregoing principles, law officers should apply the
following ten guidelines when conducting identification procedures. °5
i. Law Enforcement Should Use Identification Procedures Only When
There Is Probable Cause to Believe the Suspect Committed the Crime
Many mistaken eyewitness identifications occur in culprit-absent
identification procedures.4 °6 Some law enforcement agencies place all
suspects in photoarrays or lineups when they have little or no evidence of
the suspect's guilt.40 7  In such circumstances, there is a substantial
likelihood that the suspect is innocent and that the law enforcement agency
is conducting a culprit-absent identification procedure.40 8 Requiring law
enforcement agencies to have probable cause before placing a suspect in an
identification procedure will significantly reduce the number of culprit-
absent identification procedures.40 9
There are times, however, when law enforcement agencies use
identification procedures as an investigatory tool rather than to establish a
suspect's guilt.4 10 In such circumstances, law enforcement agencies should
distinguish between those eyewitnesses used to produce investigatory leads
and those used to establish a defendant's guilt.41' An eyewitness used to
405 It should be noted that Gary L. Wells has recently reviewed the literature in the field
and provided six recommendations for conducting identification procedures. See Gary L.
Wells, Eyewitness Identifications: Systemic Reviews, 2006 Wisc. L. REV. 615,623-31 (2006).
His recommendations coincide with six of the ten recommendations in this article. Wells's
six recommendations are: "(1) Only one suspect per lineup; (2) The suspect should not
'stand out'; (3) Caution that the offender might not be in the lineup; (4) The sequential
procedure; (5) Double-blind testing; and (6) Collect a confidence statement at the time of the
identification." Id. at 623-31. However, we independently arrived at these six
recommendations through our own review of the eyewitness literature, as reflected in earlier
drafts of this article completed before we had access to Wells's findings. We are gratified
that our recommendations coincide with those of the leading expert on identification
procedures.
406 Wells & Olson, supra note 8, at 286 ("Research repeatedly shows that culprit-absent
lineups present great problems for eyewitnesses.").
407 Id. "Investigators will place a suspect in a lineup for the slightest of reasons (e.g., a
mere hunch)." Id. at 290.
401 Id. at 289-90.
409 See id.
410 Steven Penrod, How Well Are Witnesses and Police Performing?, CRIMINAL JUSTICE,




generate leads in a case should not also be used to establish a defendant's
guilt at trial.41 2
ii. Before Conducting an Identification Procedure, It Should Be Determined
Whether the Eyewitness Has Previously Seen the Suspect
Prior to conducting an identification procedure, it is important to
413ascertain if an eyewitness has seen the suspect before or after the crime.
If this has occurred, the nature of the prior viewing of the eyewitness should
be determined,41 4 as well as the outcome of any earlier identification
procedure. 41 5 These determinations are vital because prior exposure of an
eyewitness to a suspect, such as in a mug book, substantially increases the
likelihood that an eyewitness will later identify that suspect in a subsequent
identification procedure, even if the suspect did not commit the crime.41 6
iii. Only One Suspect Should Be Included in Every Identification Procedure
Many lineups in the United States contain more than one suspect, even
when there is only one perpetrator who committed the crime.417 Research
has shown that the use of multiple suspects in identification procedures
significantly increases the risk of erroneous identifications.418  This
increased risk occurs because multiple suspects decrease the proportion of
412 See id.
413 Koehnken et al., supra note 378, at 217.
414 Id. at 218.
415 Id.
416 Evan Brown et al., Memory for Faces and the Circumstances of Encounter, 62 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 311, 311-18 (1977); see also Koehnken et al., supra note 378, at 217.
The witness might have (a) seen pictures in the media; (b) been shown one, several, or a whole
battery of photographs (mug shots) from police files in order to locate the identity of a still
unknown suspect; or (c) been present at an earlier line-up containing the suspect. What are the
consequences of having seen the suspect in earlier presented photographs on identification
accuracy in subsequently presented line-ups? ... Research shows that identification errors may
increase from previous exposure to a photograph of the suspect .... Once a witness comes to a
decision and expresses it, he or she may feel committed and may be less willing to change the
decision later.
Koehnken et al., supra note 378, at 217.
417 Wells et al., supra note 310, at 593. "Although some lineups may be composed
entirely of suspects, the opinions of legal experts and psychologists clearly argue against
such practices. The advantages of having known-innocent foils in lineups are numerous, and
single-suspect lineups are therefore the state-of-the-art model .... R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary
L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus
Sequential Lineup Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556, 557 (1985) (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
418 Wells et al., supra note 310, at 593.
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fillers4 19 in the lineup and increase the number of correct responses.
42
0
Putting more than one suspect in a lineup significantly increases the
421probability that an eyewitness will choose an innocent suspect.
iv. The Number of Lineup Members Should be Increased
Although it would be arbitrary to pick a specific number of lineup
members for each identification procedure, there is substantial evidence that
increasing the lineup size in the United States from the traditional five or
six members is necessary to decrease the number of erroneous eyewitness
identifications.422 If an innocent suspect is included in an unbiased
identification procedure, the probability that an eyewitness will identify an
innocent suspect is l/N, where N represents the number of lineup
members.423 Thus, the probability that an eyewitness will identify the
innocent suspect due to chance is 1/5 in an unbiased, five-person lineup and
1/6 in an unbiased six-person lineup.424  Levi and Lindsay have
persuasively argued that, in culprit-absent identification procedures,
eyewitnesses identify innocent lineup members approximately 60% of the
time.425  Accordingly, in unbiased five- or six-person culprit-absent
identification procedures, innocent suspects are still, on average,
respectively identified 10% and 12% of the time. These high rates of
potential error indicate that the traditional five- or six-identification
419 A lineup or photoarray contains a suspect and several known innocent individuals.
Id. at 584. The innocent members of an identification procedure are referred to either as
distractors, foils, or fillers. Id. at 584-85. The term "fillers" is used in this article to describe
known innocent lineup members in this section because it is the term that is most commonly
used by law enforcement.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Avraham M. Levi & R.C.L. Lindsay, Lineup and Photo Spread Procedures: Issues
Concerning Policy Recommendations, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 776, 787 (1990).
Considering the fact that any lineup size is arbitrary, should this limit researchers from making
further recommendations? Given the situation, it seems more reasonable to point out the
relationship between lineup size and false identification rate and recommend using larger
lineups. At the very least, comparisons to other countries could be used to demonstrate that the
American, 6-person lineup is not the largest (e.g., 9 or 10 persons are used in England and 12 in
Canada). There is no evidence that Canadian and English police are unable to obtain
identification evidence despite using larger lineups. Available research evidence shows no
decline in correct identification from simultaneous lineups of at least 20 persons. Mug shot







procedures used in the United States have too few members to prevent
erroneous identifications, even when they are otherwise fair.426
v. The Suspect in an Identification Procedure Should Not Stand Out from
the Foils
As previously stated, sound scientific principle informs us that, when
conducting an experiment, it is important not to convey the experimenter's
hypothesis to the participants.427  If the participants know the
experimenter's hypothesis, it could cause them to respond in a manner that
confirms the hypothesis, rather than in the manner they would normally
respond to the experimental stimuli.
428
Likewise, in an identification procedure where the suspect stands out,
it cannot be determined if the eyewitness selected the suspect because he or
she recognized the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime, or because of the
biasing effect of the fillers in the identification procedure. 429  In such
circumstances, an eyewitness's identification of the suspect does not
constitute forensically valid evidence of the suspect's guilt.
430
Research indicates that the best way to achieve this goal is generally
by having the fillers match the eyewitness's description of the perpetrator of
the crime. 431 At the same time, the fillers should not be so similar to the
suspect that an eyewitness cannot recognize the suspect if he or she is the
perpetrator of the crime.432 This increased similarity does not generally
provide any greater protection to innocent suspects and decreases the
number of accurate identifications.433
Showups,434  in particular, are unduly suggestive identification
procedures, resulting in more false identifications than lineups.
435
426 Levi and Lindsay state that increasing lineup size from six to twelve members could
potentially reduce false identification rates by 50% in the United States. Id. at 780.
427 Wells et al., supra note 18, at 627.
428 Id.
429 Id. at 630.
430 See id.
431 Wells et al., supra note 310, at 585. See Wells et al., supra note 18, at 632-34, for
procedures in selecting fillers when the suspect does not match the eyewitness's description,
the suspect has unique non-described features, the suspect has common non-described
features, the eyewitness description of the perpetrator is unique, or there is more than one
eyewitness.
432 See Wells et al., supra note 18, at 639.
433 id.
434 "A showup refers to the observation of a single suspect by a witness in the field,
typically at the crime scene." Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness
Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475,
477 (2001).
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Accordingly, the use of showups is only appropriate in circumstances where
less suggestive identification procedures cannot be used. 436
vi. Law Officers Should Use Sequential Identification Procedures
In simultaneous lineups, the witness views all lineup members at once and then
makes an identification decision. In sequential lineups, the witness views the lineup
members one at a time and is asked to make an identification decision after viewing
each one. The witness is instructed that each lineup member will be presented only
once and is not told how many lineup members will be presented. The lineup stops
when the witness identifies someone or has seen all the lineup members without
identifying anyone. Reliably fewer false identifications are obtained with sequential
than with simultaneous presentation. Furthermore, Lindsay, Lea, Nosworthy, et al.
(1991) found that sequential presentation reduced the effects of foil, instruction, and
clothing biases as compared to simultaneous presentation. Thus, simultaneous lineups
are considered to be presentation-biased and sequential lineups to be presentation-
unbiased.
437
Moreover, Leippe opines that sequential lineups reduce inaccurate
identifications because they "encourage witnesses to make absolute
judgments.., instead of comparative or relative judgments. 438  Even the
Department of Justice's Guide for the collection of eyewitness evidence
notes the use of sequential lineups, stating that they "produce more reliable
evidence. 439  The superiority of sequential identifications procedures in
435 Id. Behrman and Davey found the suspect identification rate to be highest for
showups, but conclude that this high rate of identification is due to the biasing nature of
showups. Id. at 486-87.
436 An example of a case in which exigent circumstances justified the use of a showup is
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall, the police held a showup in a hospital
because of concerns that the eyewitness would not live long enough to participate in other
less suggestive identification procedures. Id. at 295.
437 Stinson et al., supra note 215, at 212.
438 Leippe, supra note 88, at 918 (citations omitted).
439 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 375, at 9. The State of New Jersey requires
sequential lineups, and a New York court ordered a double-blind sequential lineup in at least
one case. Headley, supra note 94, at 699-700. Furthermore:
New Jersey's reforms have influenced other states to examine the possibility of adopting similar
lineup protocols. In 2002, Illinois Governor George H. Ryan's Commission on Capital
Punishment, charged with ensuring the accuracy and justness of capital punishment in Illinois,
recommended the implementation of eyewitness identification reforms. The North Carolina
Actual Innocence Commission created a series of recommendations in 2003 for state law
enforcement officers, including a comprehensive lineup protocol. In early 2005, the Avery Task
Force made similar recommendations for the Wisconsin criminal justice system. The Virginia
General Assembly also instructed the Virginia State Crime Commission to create guidelines for
improving lineup procedures in the commonwealth.
Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's Blind
Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS 381, 386-87 (2006).
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It should be noted that a recent study by Sherry L. Mecklenberg conducted on behalf of
the State of Illinois criticized the use of sequential lineups. SHERRY L. MECKLENBERG,
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON
SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 6 (2006), available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/Illinois Report.pdf ("Surprisingly, the
Illinois data did not bear out the research experiments that sequential, double-blind lineups
produce a lower rate of known false identifications. Instead, the sequential, double-blind
procedures resulted in an overall higher rate of known false identifications than did the
simultaneous lineups.").
However, the experimental design of the Illinois study has been strongly criticized by
Gary L. Wells, the leading eyewitness researcher:
My main reaction is disappointment and concern that the design of the study does not permit any
clear conclusions. The reason it does not permit clear conclusions is because the simultaneous
lineups never used the double-blind procedure whereas the sequential lineups always used the
double-blind procedure. This is extremely problematic because the failure to use double-blind
procedures with the simultaneous lineups leaves open several "lineup-administrator influenced"
means by which filler identifications could be suppressed and identifications of the suspect
enhanced. These lineup-administrator influences were not available for the sequential because
the sequential was conducted using double-blind procedures.
Gary L. Wells, Gary L. Wells' Comments on the Mecklenberg Report 1 (2006), http://www.
psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/llinois-ProjectWellscomments.pdf.
Wells continues:
There is one claim in the Mecklenberg Report that I can state unequivocally to be false, or at
least terribly misleading. Specifically, it is stated on page 32 that "The protocols and forms, like
the surveys, were viewed and approved by Professors Malpass, Ebbesen, Wells, and Steblay."
Although I did examine the survey, I had no input to or knowledge of the design of the study. In
fact, I was shocked when I learned of the failure of the study to include a double-blind control
for the simultaneous lineups, a fact I learned only when I read the final report. Nancy Steblay
clearly states that she too had no idea that this study would have this design flaw. I have asked
Sherri [sic] Mecklenberg to correct this misperception, but no corrections have yet been made as
far as I am aware.
Id. at4.
Nancy Steblay, another leading expert, states, "My primary concern with the Illinois
report is that its conclusion appears to [have] minimal appreciation of the underlying reasons
for these outcomes or the broader context of what is known about eyewitness fallibility."
Nancy Steblay, Observations on the Illinois Lineup Data 6 (May 3, 2006), available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/Steblay Observations on theIllinois
_Data.pdf. She also reports that "[Hennepin County]'s [the county of Minnesota where
Minneapolis is located] conclusion is that the blind-sequential procedure is working well in
Minnesota. Acceptable suspect ID rates and lower filler rates suggest a protocol that will
help to convict the guilty and protect the innocent." Id. at 7. "The experience of the pilot
project [in Hennepin County] indicates that the double-blind sequential protocol is workable
for police in both large and small departments without undercutting the ability to solve cases.
At the same time, the protocol elicits valuable new information for the effective
investigations and prosecution of criminal cases." Klobuchar et al., supra note 439, at 413.
The State of Wisconsin also recently declined to alter its new eyewitness procedures in
response to the Illinois report, stating that "the design of the program does not seem to
support [the] inference or conclusion [that the higher rate of filler identification is due to the
sequential procedure]." Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, Wis. Dep't
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preventing erroneous identifications has been demonstrated in experiments
in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Germany,
and Australia, making it one of the most highly verified findings in all of
the scientific literature on eyewitness testimony.4 °
vii. The Lineup Administrator Should Not Know the Identity of the Suspect
It is common practice for the lineup administrator to know the identity
of the suspect when conducting an identification procedure. 44' Referring
back to the lineup-as-experiment analogy, scientists have long known that
double blind procedures, where the experimenter does not know which
participants are in the experimental and control groups, are necessary to
prevent improper influencing of participants through verbal and nonverbal
cues. 4 4  In other words, double-blind procedures are used in experiments
because people have a natural tendency to test their hypotheses in a manner
that confirms them.443  Furthermore, research reveals that a lineup
administrator's knowledge of the identity of the suspect does indeed
increase the probability that the eyewitness will identify the suspect as the
perpetrator of the crime.444 Thus, the lineup administrator should not know
the identity of the suspect.445
of Justice, Response to Chicago Report on Eyewitness Identification Procedures 4 (July 21,
2006), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/ILRptResponse.pdf. It further states
that "the extensive prior laboratory research revealing that the double-blind and sequential
procedures are superior remains the best scientific information available." Id.
440 Wells et al., supra note 310 at 586.
441 Wells et al., supra note 18, at 627.
442 Bradfield et al., supra note 15, at 118 ("A lineup administrator who is invested in the
outcome of a witness's identification cannot be expected to have the same reaction (verbally
or nonverbally) to a filler identification that he or she has to an identification of the suspect.
Even if investigators are cautioned against giving feedback to eyewitnesses, involuntary
reactions to a witness's selection are difficult to conceal."). "Despite research findings
showing its benefits, police are resistant to using double-blind testing because they perceive
it as a loss of control and as a suggestion that they cannot conduct fair lineups." Ryann M.
Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness
Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106 (2004).
443 Wells et al., supra note 18, at 627-29.
444 Bradfield et al., supra note 15, at 112.
445 Garrioch & Brimacombe, supra note 331, at 306. The Illinois study also criticized
the use of the double-blind method. However, it has been refuted by such scholars as Wells
and Steblay and rejected by the State of Wisconsin. See discussion supra note 439.
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viii. Eyewitnesses Should Be Given Cautionary Instructions
The lineup administrator should inform the eyewitness that the
perpetrator of the crime may not be in the lineup.446 By giving this
instruction, the lineup administrator alerts the eyewitness to the possibility
that the perpetrator of the crime is not in the lineup, thereby legitimizing the
decision of an eyewitness who makes this determination and discouraging
relative judgments by the eyewitness.447 The lineup administrator should
also inform the eyewitness he or she does not know the suspect's identity.448
This prevents the eyewitness from looking to the administrator for clues to
the identity of the suspect or to validate their choice of a lineup member.449
Research has shown that these instructions significantly decrease the
number of erroneous eyewitness identifications without significantly
decreasing the number of accurate identifications.45 ° In fact, a study by
Steblay, which combined the results of 22 prior tests on this topic using
2588 participants, found that a cautionary instruction warning that the
perpetrator may not be in the lineup reduced the rate of erroneous
identifications by 42% in culprit-absent identification procedures. It also
only reduced the rate of accurate identifications in culprit-present
identification procedures by 2%. 4 5 1
ix. All Identification Procedures Should Be Videotaped
Videotaping of identification procedures serves several purposes.
First, due to memory error, confirmation bias, or intentional distortions, the
manner in which identification procedures are conducted is not always
accurately reported in law enforcement reports or in eyewitness
testimony.452 Second, videotaping of identification procedures would help
to protect law officers from false accusations that an identification
procedure was improperly conducted or biased.453 Last, videotaping is
necessary to ensure that there is a complete record of how the identification




450 Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Lineup Instructions Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 294 (1997) (meta-
analysis concerning a cautionary instruction warning the eyewitness that the perpetrator may
not be in the lineup).
451 Wells et al., supra note 310, at 585.
452 Saul M. Kassin, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: The Fifth Rule, 22 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV., 649, 649 (1998).
411 Id. at 650.
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procedure was conducted so that juries, judges, and attorneys can evaluate
the procedure's fairness. 454 Without such a record, all the other safeguards
for conducting fair identification procedures would be meaningless.
455
x. An Eyewitness Should Make a Clear Statement of His or Her Confidence
at the Time of the Identification and Prior to Receiving Any Feedback
As we have seen, eyewitness confidence is the single most important
factor that triers of fact use in evaluating the accuracy of eyewitness
456identifications. However, we also know eyewitness confidence is
malleable.457 By the time of trial, it has little diagnostic value in
determining the accuracy of an eyewitness's identification. 458  Research
also shows that, when eyewitnesses are asked at trial how confident they
were when they made the identifications, they do not have accurate
memories of their level of confidence at the time of the identifications,
reporting instead their present level of confidence. 459 Accordingly, taking a
statement of confidence from an eyewitness after an identification ensures
that the most accurate possible estimate of the eyewitness's true level of
confidence is obtained.46 °
Because of the importance of identification procedures to accurate
identification and because most of the factors that affect identification
454 Id.
411 See id. at 652.
456 Wells & Bradfield, supra note 65, at 361.
457 Id.
458 Id. at 362.
459 Id.
460 See id. at 375 ("Even if the confidence-prophylactic effect is short-lived, at the very
least the confidence statement taken at the time of the identification can then be a matter of
record and subject to usual discovery procedures so that any later inflation in confidence can
be noted for the trier of fact and perhaps discounted accordingly.").
A recent review of existing research underscored the need for lineup administrators to assess
eyewitness confidence before providing any feedback. Analysis of twenty laboratory tests
demonstrated that confirmatory feedback immediately after the identification (i.e., "Good, you
identified the actual suspect.") significantly inflated the participant-witness's retrospective
confidence reports when compared with a control group that was told nothing about
identification accuracy. In other words, those witnesses whose choice was praised indicated that
they had been more certain of the identification from the outset. Confirmatory feedback
similarly influenced eyewitnesses' reports of the quality of their view of the perpetrator, their
degree of attention, their ease of identification, and of the basis for their identification.
Participant-witnesses who received immediate confirmatory feedback were also more willing to
testify about the identification and reported a greater ability to remember strangers. These
outcomes support the desirability of double-blind lineup administration and prompt, full
recording of eyewitness certainty comments.
Klobuchar et al., supra note 439, at 390.
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accuracy can be controlled, implementation of the guidelines enumerated
above is one of the most potent means available to the criminal justice
system to reduce eyewitness error. However, improvements in eyewitness
evidence gathering and identification procedures can only be effective if the
principal participants in the criminal justice system are educated about their
importance and use.
C. THIRD COMPONENT OF THE TRIPARTITE SOLUTION: EDUCATING
THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
ABOUT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
"I had," said he, "come to an entirely erroneous conclusion, which shows, my dear
Watson, how dangerous it always is to reason from insufficient data."
461
1. Introduction
As previously discussed, psychological studies have indicated that
education about eyewitness testimony is both clearly necessary and sorely
needed. For example, Wise and Safer surveyed 160 judges about their
knowledge of eyewitness factors, their beliefs about jurors' knowledge of
eyewitness factors, and what legal safeguards they would permit attorneys
to use to educate juries about eyewitness factors.462 They found that the
judges in their survey had limited knowledge of eyewitness factors.4 63
Judges who were more knowledgeable about eyewitness factors had
many of the beliefs that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness error.464
Thus, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors for the judges was associated
with: (1) permitting the greater use of legal safeguards, including expert
testimony, to educate jurors about eyewitness factors; (2) believing jurors
have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors; (3) agreeing defendants
should be convicted solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony only in
exceptional circumstances; (4) knowing the important role that eyewitness
error plays in wrongful convictions; (5) realizing judges need more training
on eyewitness factors; and (6) reporting marginally greater exposure to
educational materials about eyewitness testimony.465
461 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of the Speckled Band, in GREAT CASES OF
SHERLOCK HOLMES 152, 178 (Franklin Library 1987).
462 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 7.
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These beliefs were not associated with the number of years a judge had
practiced law or been on the bench.466 They were also not associated with
judicial position or whether a judge had practiced criminal law. 467 The
study suggests that legal and judicial experience do not ensure that judges
will have the beliefs necessary to reduce eyewitness error significantly.468
Well-designed education programs about eyewitness testimony may be
beneficial in helping judges develop those beliefs.469
In a follow-up study, Wise and Safer administered the same
questionnaire on eyewitness testimony to 57 law students and 121
undergraduates to compare their responses to the judges. 470 The result of
this study showed that all three groups had limited knowledge about
eyewitness factors. 471 The judges were no more knowledgeable about
eyewitness testimony than the undergraduates. 472 The law students were
slightly more knowledgeable than the other two groups.473
The study indicated that, like the more knowledgeable judges, more
knowledgeable undergraduates and law students had many of the beliefs
that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness errors, such as being less
willing to convict defendants solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony,474
giving more accurate estimates of the number of wrongful convictions due
to eyewitness testimony,475 and reporting greater skepticism about jurors'
knowledge of eyewitness factors.476 Increased knowledge for the students
was also associated with greater willingness to permit the use of legal
safeguards, including expert testimony.4 7  This study suggests that
educating jurors, attorneys, police officers, and judges about eyewitness




469 See Wise & Safer, supra note 148, at 12-13, 15.








478 Id. at 4.
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2. Benefits of Educating the Principal Participants About Eyewitness
Testimony
Educating the principal participants in criminal trials about eyewitness
testimony could have many important benefits. For example, judges who
are more knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony may be more likely to
grant motions to suppress eyewitness identifications for suggestive
identification procedures, to admit eyewitness expert testimony when it is
needed, and to draft better jury instructions about eyewitness testimony. In
some cases, knowledgeable judges may be able to draft jury instructions
and conduct trials in such a manner that eyewitness expert testimony would
be unnecessary.
Attorneys who are more knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony
may be better able to determine when identification procedures are
suggestive, when law officers' interviews of eyewitnesses have
contaminated their memory of the crime, and when eyewitness testimony is
likely to be inaccurate. They may be more likely to file motions to suppress
identifications and present eyewitness expert testimony when it is needed.
In addition, more knowledgeable attorneys could more effectively cross-
examine eyewitnesses and present more cogent arguments to the trier of
fact about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
Law officers who are more knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony
would obtain more information from eyewitnesses, would be less likely to
contaminate eyewitnesses' memory of crimes, and would be more likely to
conduct unbiased identification procedures.
Finally, more knowledgeable jurors would be better able to assess the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony; to understand cross-examinations,
attorney arguments, and jury instructions about eyewitnesses; and to
comprehend eyewitness expert testimony.
As was stated previously, many legal safeguards, such as cross-
examination and closing arguments, are ineffective in part because of
attorneys', judges', and jurors' lack of knowledge about eyewitness
factors.47 9 Increasing these groups' knowledge of eyewitness factors would
enhance the effectiveness of legal safeguards and decrease the need for
eyewitness experts.
3. Means to Educate Principal Participants About Eyewitness Testimony
There are several means that could be used to educate the principal
participants in the criminal justice system about eyewitness testimony. Law
schools, police academies, judicial education programs, and continuing
479 See discussion supra Part IV.A. l.b.i-v.
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legal education programs could educate law students, law officers, judges,
and attorneys about eyewitness testimony. Jurors could be educated about
eyewitness testimony when they are called for jury duty. Psychology and
criminal justice courses in high schools and colleges could also be used to
educate the general public about eyewitness testimony. Given the high
social cost of wrongful convictions, the time and money invested in
education would be well spent.
V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CONCERNS AND CONCLUSION
Headley explains why it is necessary to incorporate scientific research
into constitutional jurisprudence:
To banish scientific advancements from the realm of constitutional law is to ground
the narrative of constitutional jurisprudence in myth and to shroud the people's fate in
mystery. Moreover, a lack of willingness to base its decisions in well-supported
scientific research supports the perception that the Court's opinions are nothing more
than just that: the opinions of a group of nine people assembled under the guise of
law.... [We should take] a normative view of the Due Process Clause that would
require the Court to rely upon widely accepted research in finding inadequate "process
of law" in current approaches to eyewitness identification procedures. In the end, it is
ironic that social scientific research seems designed to be relegated to a mere footnote
in the annals of constitutional jurisprudence.
4 8 0
Dripps posits that procedural due process analysis asks us if the state's
procedure subjects the accused to an "unacceptably high risk of an
erroneous decision. 'A8  Headley states that "scholars readily agree that the
Due Process Clause guarantees a minimum level of procedural fairness.
' 482
Applying this analysis to eyewitness testimony leads to the conclusion that
due process requires the elimination of unreasonable risks that defendants
will be wrongfully convicted from eyewitness errors. Therefore, it is
480 Headley, supra note 94, at 702. Dripps states:
[T]he conservative Court practically has banned due process analysis from police practice cases,
leaving the field regulated solely by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. This is a grave
disservice to innocent suspects. Pretrial procedure can leave the criminal defendant facing
erroneous but now entrenched identification testimony, without the benefit of exculpatory
physical evidence the police neglected to collect or preserve, defended by an overworked lawyer
with no time to conduct a new investigation. This can (and does) happen, without any
unreasonable searches, without any compelled testimony, and without any denial of counsel.
The distinction between investigation and adjudication is far less palpable than current doctrine
admits.
Dripps, supra note 8, at 649-50.
481 Dripps, supra note 8, at 653.
482 Headley, supra note 94, at 696. Indeed, the Supreme Court has found due process
violations in some suggestive lineup procedures, such as in Foster v. California, 394 U.S.
440, 442 (1969). In most cases, however, the Court has held that suggestive identification
procedures do not violate due process. Headley, supra note 94, at 697-98.
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necessary to determine what procedural safeguards are required to achieve
this constitutionally mandated level of eyewitness accuracy.
This article's review of scientific research on eyewitness error has
revealed the following. Eyewitness testimony plays a role in over half of
all wrongful convictions.483 Many eyewitnesses have great difficulty
making accurate identifications of perpetrators of crimes.484 The standard
law enforcement interview of an eyewitness significantly contributes to
wrongful convictions because it fails to obtain much of the information that
an eyewitness knows about a crime and contaminates an eyewitness's
memory of the crime.485 Once a suggestive identification procedure is
conducted, generally it cannot be determined whether an eyewitness's
identification of a suspect is due to the eyewitness's memory of the
perpetrator of the crime or to the suggestive identification procedure. 86
Because an eyewitness's memory is highly malleable, at trial most
eyewitnesses cannot accurately recall the quality of their view of the
perpetrator of the crime, how well they remembered the details of his or her
face, the amount of attention they paid to the perpetrator, the basis for their
selection of a lineup member, the ease or speed of their identification, and
their degree of confidence in the accuracy of their identification when they
made it. 487  Generally, eyewitnesses cannot determine if a lineup
administrator has intentionally or unintentionally influenced their choice of
488the suspect of a crime. When assessing eyewitness testimony, jurors tend
to rely on factors that are not good indicators of eyewitness accuracy and
489ignore factors that are good indicators of eyewitness accuracy. Jurors
cannot distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses.490
Scientific research also leads to the conclusion that current procedural
safeguards are inadequate to prevent wrongful convictions from eyewitness
error. The factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Neil and Manson
are grossly deficient, including factors that are irrelevant to assessing
eyewitness accuracy and omitting others that are necessary to make this
determination. 49  These factors further contribute to eyewitness error
because they are premised on fallacious assumptions about eyewitness
483 See discussion supra Part II.A.
484 Id.
485 See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
486 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
487 Wells & Bradfield, supra note 65, at 366-67.
488 Haw & Fisher, supra note 442, at 11 10.
489 See discussion supra Part IV.A. L.a.
490 Id.
491 See discussion supra Part II.A.
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testimony.492 They assume that at trial eyewitnesses can accurately recall
the eyewitness factors that the Supreme Court has enumerated for assessing
eyewitness accuracy and that it can be determined whether an eyewitness
identification from a suggestive procedure is accurate.493
Current procedural safeguards fail to mandate that eyewitness expert
testimony be admitted when the sole or primary evidence against the
defendant is eyewitness testimony, though these cases present the greatest
risk that eyewitness error will result in an erroneous verdict. They also do
not require that interviews and identification procedures be conducted in a
manner that would significantly reduce eyewitness error.
In short, current procedural safeguards for preventing eyewitness error
violate due process because they create an unreasonable risk that a
defendant will be wrongfully convicted because of eyewitness error. They
also violate procedural due process because they fail to incorporate
scientific procedures for reducing eyewitness error, which could be
implemented without imposing an unreasonable financial or administrative
burden on the legal system.
494
Dripps opines that, to truly honor procedural due process, protocols
designed to avert eyewitness error like the tripartite solution should be
converted into "Miranda-like rules of constitutional law. 495  Thus, we
could effectively reduce erroneous eyewitness testimony to levels that
comport with procedural due process by instituting the tripartite solution to
eyewitness error proposed in this article. By admitting eyewitness expert
testimony in appropriate circumstances and by educating the principal
participants in the criminal justice system about eyewitness testimony, the
legal system will insure that triers of fact can competently assess the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Requiring law enforcement agencies to
use the cognitive interview will significantly increase the amount of
accurate information that is obtained from eyewitnesses and prevent them
from contaminating eyewitnesses' memories of crimes. Implementing the
guidelines for conducting identification procedures delineated in this article
492 See Koehnken et al., supra note 378, at 208.
493 See id.; see also Klobuchar et al., supra note 439, at 390.
494 See, e.g., Headley, supra note 94, at 700. Klobuchar states:
Overall, police chiefs and investigators alike found the pilot project [for implementing double-
blind sequential lineup procedures] to be easier to implement and less work than anticipated.
Implementation was extremely efficient.... The pilot project also involved minimal cost. From
an administrative perspective, the police chiefs initially wondered whether the need for blind
administrators would significantly increase work-hours. As Minnetonka police chief Joy Rikala
noted, however, "There [are] no cost implications of this. It's negligible."
Klobuchar, supra note 439, at 409 (internal citations omitted).
495 Dripps, supra note 8, at 658-59.
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will significantly reduce the number of erroneous identifications and give
triers of fact an objective standard for determining if an identification
procedure is fair.
Finally, implementing the tripartite solution is essential because the
continual discovery of eyewitness error undermines the credibility of the
legal system.496 Adapting the tripartite solution is also vital because, as Dr.
Wells states, "False identifications are a double injustice .... It is a
nightmare for the innocent person, while the actual culprit remains at
large., 497 Thanks to scientific research, it is a nightmare from which we can
at long last awake.
496 Wise & Safer, supra note 11, at 16.
497 Goleman, supra note 3, at C7 (quoting interview with Gary Wells).
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